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Strategic Incentives and the Optimal Sale of Information

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  • Rosina Rodríguez Olivera

Abstract

A monopolist data seller offers information to privately informed data buyers. I characterize the seller's optimal menu, which screens between two types of buyers. Buyers' preferences for information allow the seller to extract all surplus, and the optimal menu's features are determined by the interaction between buyers' strategic incentives and the correlation of their private information. The seller offers perfect information to the buyer with the highest willingness to pay and partial information, which makes this type indifferent. Both experiments are informative even when buyers have congruent beliefs if they have coordination (anticoordination) incentives and their private information is negatively (positively) correlated.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosina Rodríguez Olivera, 2024. "Strategic Incentives and the Optimal Sale of Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 296-353, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:2:p:296-353
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210372
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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