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Full Implementation under Ambiguity

Author

Listed:
  • Huiyi Guo
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis

Abstract

This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value.

Suggested Citation

  • Huiyi Guo & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2021. "Full Implementation under Ambiguity," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 148-178, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:1:p:148-78
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180184
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Takashi Ui, 2021. "Strategic Ambiguity in Global Games," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 032, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 559-585.
    3. Takashi Ui, 2023. "Strategic Ambiguity in Global Games," Papers 2303.12263, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    4. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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