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Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Some New Evidence

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  • Sophocles Mavroeidis

Abstract

I revisit the question of indeterminacy in US monetary policy using limited-information identification-robust methods. I find that the conclusions of Clarida, Galí, and Gernter (2000) that policy was inactive before 1979 are robust, but the evidence over the Volcker-Greenspan periods is inconclusive. I show that this is in fact consistent with policy being active over that period. Problems of identification also arise because policy reaction has been more gradual recently. At a methodological level, the paper demonstrates that identification issues should be taken seriously, and that identification-robust methods can be informative even when they produce wide confidence sets. (E31, E32, E52, E65,)

Suggested Citation

  • Sophocles Mavroeidis, 2010. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Some New Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 491-503, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:1:p:491-503 Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.491
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

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