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An Auction Model of Intellectual Property Protection: Patent Versus Copyright

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  • Michael Waterson
  • Norman Ireland

Abstract

In this paper several firms compete for the right to obtain intellectual property protection for a basic idea which has subsequent potential applications. The modelling employs an auction analogy, taking the context to be an n-player all-pay auction, with a reserve. We find that, even taking only firms' own utilities into account, welfare has no interior maximum, so that either maximal, or minimal, protection is optimal. Through examining a simple version of this game, we suggest that software is socially better protected by means of copyright rather than patent.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Waterson & Norman Ireland, 1998. "An Auction Model of Intellectual Property Protection: Patent Versus Copyright," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 49-50, pages 247-263.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:49-50:p:247-263
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076117
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    Cited by:

    1. Kultti, Klaus & Takalo, Tuomas, 2008. "Optimal fragmentation of intellectual property rights," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 137-149, January.

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