Pierre Chaigneau
Personal Details
First Name: | Pierre |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Chaigneau |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pch1493 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
https://sites.google.com/view/pierrechaigneau | |
Terminal Degree: | 2010 London School of Economics (LSE) (from RePEc Genealogy) |
Affiliation
School of Business
Queen's University
Kingston, Canadahttp://business.queensu.ca/
RePEc:edi:sbqueca (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2023. "A Theory of Fair CEO Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 17782, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2021.
"How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
15755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2022. "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(1), pages 168-206.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2022. "How should performance signals affect contracts?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 109005, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021.
"The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019.
"The informativeness principle without the first-order approach,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
102226, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 743-755.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018.
"Does improved information improve incentives?,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
102227, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017.
"Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts,"
Post-Print
halshs-02292785, HAL.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 14-16.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 2016.
"Downside risk neutral probabilities,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
118980, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2020. "Downside risk-neutral probabilities," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 65-77, April.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2015. "Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities," Cahiers de recherche 1521, CIRPEE.
- Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014.
"The Generalized Informativeness Principle,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Generalized Informativeness Principle," NBER Working Papers 20729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014.
"The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability," NBER Working Papers 20456, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2014. "Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective," Cahiers de recherche 1406, CIRPEE.
- Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014.
"The Value of Informativeness for Contracting,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," NBER Working Papers 20542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "The value of informativeness for contracting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119024, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013. "The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2012. "Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1224, CIRPEE.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2012. "The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119055, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2012.
"The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
119040, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, "undated". "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," FMG Discussion Papers dp713, Financial Markets Group.
- Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2012. "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," CEPR Discussion Papers 9182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bouvard, Matthieu & Chaigneau, Pierre & Motta, Adolfo, 2012.
"Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
119052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises," FMG Discussion Papers dp700, Financial Markets Group.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Cahiers de recherche 1206, CIRPEE.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012.
"The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation,"
Cahiers de recherche
1207, CIRPEE.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018. "The optimal timing of CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2011.
"Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
119059, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche 1208, CIRPEE.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2011. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," FMG Discussion Papers dp693, Financial Markets Group.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2010.
"Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
119086, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts," FMG Discussion Papers dp654, Financial Markets Group.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2010.
"The optimal timing of executive compensation,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
119081, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation," FMG Discussion Papers dp660, Financial Markets Group.
Articles
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023.
"The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring,"
Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
- Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021. "The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2022.
"How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(1), pages 168-206.
- Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2021. "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2022. "How should performance signals affect contracts?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 109005, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2020.
"Downside risk-neutral probabilities,"
Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 65-77, April.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2015. "Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities," Cahiers de recherche 1521, CIRPEE.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 2016. "Downside risk neutral probabilities," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118980, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019.
"The informativeness principle without the first-order approach,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 743-755.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102226, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2018. "The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 1297-1339, June.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018.
"Does improved information improve incentives?,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102227, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 747-768, May.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018.
"The optimal timing of CEO compensation,"
Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017.
"Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 14-16.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Post-Print halshs-02292785, HAL.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2015. "Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(15), pages 1357-1373, December.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015.
"Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
- Bouvard, Matthieu & Chaigneau, Pierre & Motta, Adolfo, 2012. "Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises," FMG Discussion Papers dp700, Financial Markets Group.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Cahiers de recherche 1206, CIRPEE.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2015. "Changes in probability distributions and the form of compensation contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 223-232, October.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013.
"Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion,"
Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche 1208, CIRPEE.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2011. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," FMG Discussion Papers dp693, Financial Markets Group.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2011. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119059, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 778-789.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Expliquer et contenir la prise de risque excessive des banques," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 89(2), pages 147-151, Juin.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021.
"The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
Cited by:
- Nikos Vafeas & Adamos Vlittis, 2024. "Earnings quality and board meeting frequency," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 1037-1067, April.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019.
"The informativeness principle without the first-order approach,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
102226, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 743-755.
Cited by:
- Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023.
"Optimal technology design,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
- Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alexey Smolin & Balazs Szentes, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Post-Print hal-04224372, HAL.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018.
"Does improved information improve incentives?,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
102227, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
Cited by:
- Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021.
"The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
- Sebastian Gryglewicz & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Geoffery Zheng, 2020. "Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1248-1277, March.
- Chang, Jen-Wen, 2020. "Monitoring and competing principals: A double-edged sword," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
- Dirk Hackbarth & Alejandro Rivera & Tak-Yuen Wong, 2022. "Optimal Short-Termism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(9), pages 6477-6505, September.
- Hackbarth, Dirk & Rivera, Alejandro & Wong, Tak-Yuen, 2018. "Optimal Short-Termism," CEPR Discussion Papers 12588, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017.
"Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts,"
Post-Print
halshs-02292785, HAL.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 14-16.
Cited by:
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2022.
"How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(1), pages 168-206.
- Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2021. "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2022. "How should performance signals affect contracts?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 109005, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 2016.
"Downside risk neutral probabilities,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
118980, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2020. "Downside risk-neutral probabilities," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 65-77, April.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2015. "Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities," Cahiers de recherche 1521, CIRPEE.
Cited by:
- Ekaterina Pirozhkova, 2017. "Banks' balance sheet, uncertainty and macroeconomy," EcoMod2017 10430, EcoMod.
- Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014.
"The Generalized Informativeness Principle,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Generalized Informativeness Principle," NBER Working Papers 20729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Cited by:
- Christian Ewerhart, 2014.
"An envelope approach to tournament design,"
ECON - Working Papers
184, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2015.
- Ewerhart, Christian, 2016. "An envelope approach to tournament design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-9.
- Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014.
"The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability," NBER Working Papers 20456, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Cited by:
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014.
"The Value of Informativeness for Contracting,"
NBER Working Papers
20542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "The value of informativeness for contracting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119024, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 10180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Miguel Anton & Florian Ederer & Mireia Gine & Martin Schmalz, 2016.
"Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2046, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Miguel Anton & Florian Ederer & Mireia Gine & Martin C. Schmalz, 2022. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," NBER Working Papers 30785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1294-1355.
- Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin C. Schmalz, 2016. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 6178, CESifo.
- Schmalz, Martin & Ederer, Florian & Gine, Mireia & Antón, Miguel, 2018. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12674, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Miguel Anton & Florian Ederer & Mireia Gine & Martin Schmalz, 2016. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2046R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2017.
- Engert Andreas & Goldlücke Susanne, 2017.
"Why Agents Need Discretion: The Business Judgment Rule as Optimal Standard of Care,"
Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-38, March.
- Engert, Andreas & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2013. "Why agents need discretion: The business judgment rule as optimal standard of care," Working Papers 13-04, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Kelly Shue & Richard Townsend, 2016. "Growth through Rigidity: An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay," NBER Working Papers 21975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bengt Holmström, 2017. "Pay for Performance and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 1753-1777, July.
- FOSCHI, Matteo; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís Pedro, 2017. "Subjective Performance Evaluation of Employees with Biased Beliefs," Economics Working Papers ECO 2017/08, European University Institute.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016.
"Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer,"
Scholarly Articles
34651704, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2018. "Contracting to compete for flows," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 289-319.
- Heider, Florian & Calcagno, Riccardo, 2016. "Liquidity, Information Aggregation, and Market-Based Pay in an Efficient Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 11298, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2014.
"The Value of Informativeness for Contracting,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," NBER Working Papers 20542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "The value of informativeness for contracting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119024, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
Cited by:
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016.
"Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer,"
Scholarly Articles
34651704, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2018. "Contracting to compete for flows," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 289-319.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013.
"The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
Cited by:
- Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2016. "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Systemic Risk-Taking," International Finance Discussion Papers 1164, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017.
"How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?,"
Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
- Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu, 2009. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-076/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Bouvard, Matthieu & Chaigneau, Pierre & Motta, Adolfo, 2012.
"Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
119052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises," FMG Discussion Papers dp700, Financial Markets Group.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Cahiers de recherche 1206, CIRPEE.
Cited by:
- Natalya Zelenyuk & Robert Faff & Shams Pathan, 2021. "The impact of voluntary capital adequacy disclosure on bank lending and liquidity creation," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(3), pages 3915-3935, September.
- Chen, Qi & Goldstein, Itay & Huang, Zeqiong & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2022. "Bank transparency and deposit flows," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 475-501.
- Céline Gauthier & Alfred Lehar & Héctor Pérez Saiz & Moez Souissi, 2015. "Emergency Liquidity Facilities, Signalling and Funding Costs," Staff Working Papers 15-44, Bank of Canada.
- Evangelos Vasileiou, 2022. "Inaccurate Value at Risk Estimations: Bad Modeling or Inappropriate Data?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 59(3), pages 1155-1171, March.
- Philippon, Thomas & Faria e castro, Miguel & Martinez, Joseba, 2016.
"Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
11408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Miguel Faria-e-Castro & Joseba Martinez & Thomas Philippon, 2015. "Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity," NBER Working Papers 21201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas Philippon & Joseba Martinez & Miguel de Faria e Castro, 2015. "Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity," 2015 Meeting Papers 1146, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Miguel Faria-e-Castro & Joseba Martinez & Thomas Philippon, 2017. "Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1683-1707.
- Philippon, Thomas & Martinez, Joseba & Faria e castro, Miguel, 2015. "Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity," CEPR Discussion Papers 10614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Moreno, Diego & Takalo, Tuomas, 2021. "Precision of public information disclosures, banks' stability and welfare," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 3/2021, Bank of Finland.
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"Opacity: Insurance and Fragility,"
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- Avis Devine & Andrew Sanderford & Chongyu Wang, 2024. "Sustainability and Private Equity Real Estate Returns," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 161-187, February.
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- Jungherr, Joachim, 2016. "Bank opacity and financial crises," Economics Working Papers ADE2016/02, European University Institute.
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"Should regulators always be transparent? a bank run experiment,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
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- Rhee, Keeyoung & Dogra, Keshav, 2024. "Stress tests and model monoculture," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
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- Yaron Leitner, 2014. "Should regulators reveal information about banks?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q3, pages 1-8.
- Michal Kowalik, 2016. "Opacity and Disclosure in Short-Term Wholesale Funding Markets," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 16-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Timmermann, Allan & Schmidt, Lawrence & , & Wermers, Russ, 2017. "Transparency, Investor Information Acquisition, and Money Market Fund Risk Rebalancing during the 2011-12 Eurozone Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 11895, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chu, Rongtai & Fan, Zhongjie & Liu, Zehao & Tang, Dunzhe, 2024. "Optimal primary dealer selection in financial networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
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"Central Bank Screening, Moral Hazard, and the Lender of Last Resort Policy,"
Working Papers
1506, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Mei Li & Frank Milne & Junfeng Qiu, 2013. "Central Bank Screening, Moral Hazard, And The Lender Of Last Resort Policy," Working Paper 1317, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Mei Li & Frank Milne & Junfeng Qiu, 2022. "Central bank screening, moral hazard, and the lender of last resort policy," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(3), pages 244-264, September.
- Karlo Kauko, 2021.
"The Vanishing Interest Income of Chinese Banks,"
Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 20(3), pages 94-113, Fall.
- Kauko, Karlo, 2020. "The vanishing interest income of Chinese banks," BOFIT Discussion Papers 2/2020, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
- Bo, Wang & Suli, Zheng, 2020. "Heterogeneous fragility, systematic panic and optimal transparency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
- Itay Goldstein & Alexandr Kopytov & Lin Shen & Haotian Xiang, 2020. "Bank Heterogeneity and Financial Stability," NBER Working Papers 27376, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2023. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1055-1095, April.
- Briana Chang & Martin Szydlowski, 2020. "The Market for Conflicted Advice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(2), pages 867-903, April.
- Itay Goldstein & Chong Huang, 2020. "Credit Rating Inflation and Firms' Investments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(6), pages 2929-2972, December.
- Kim, Jinyong & Kim, Mingook & Lee, Jeong Hwan, 2019. "The effect of TARP on loan loss provisions and bank transparency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 79-99.
- König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022.
"Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
- Christian König-Kersting & Stefan Trautmann & Razvan Vlahu, 2020. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Working Papers 665, DNB.
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- König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2020. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 14/2020, Bank of Finland.
- Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2018. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," 2018 Meeting Papers 566, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Shapiro, Joel & Zeng, Jing, 2019. "Stress Testing and Bank Lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 13907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carlos Corona & Lin Nan & Gaoqing Zhang, 2019. "The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(5), pages 1161-1200, December.
- Terovitis, Spyros, 2022. "Information disclosure and the feedback effect in capital markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
- Carré, Sylvain, 2022. "Disclosures, rollover risk, and debt runs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
- Xuewen Liu, 2018. "Diversification and Systemic Bank Runs," 2018 Meeting Papers 739, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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- Biswas, Sonny & Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2022. "Bank capital structure and regulation: Overcoming and embracing adverse selection," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 973-992.
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- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012.
"The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation,"
Cahiers de recherche
1207, CIRPEE.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018. "The optimal timing of CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
Cited by:
- Emmanuel Iatridis, George, 2018. "Accounting discretion and executive cash compensation: An empirical investigation of corporate governance, credit ratings and firm value," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-49.
- Josef Schroth, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(5), pages 1335-1381, December.
- Inderst, Roman & Hoffmann, Florian & Opp, Marcus, 2014.
"Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
9877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2015. "Regulating deferred incentive pay," IMFS Working Paper Series 91, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
- Rosalia Santulli, 2022. "“Fairness of CEO Compensation. A multi-faceted and multi-cultural framework to structure executive pay” by M.A. Eklund (Springer, 2019)," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 26(1), pages 315-325, March.
- Wang, Cheng, 1997.
"Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model,"
Staff General Research Papers Archive
5170, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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- Wang, Cheng, 1997. "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 72-105, September.
- Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017.
"How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?,"
Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
- Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu, 2009. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-076/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Josef Schroth, 2015. "Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation," Staff Working Papers 15-25, Bank of Canada.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2011.
"Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
119059, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche 1208, CIRPEE.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2011. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," FMG Discussion Papers dp693, Financial Markets Group.
Cited by:
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts," FMG Discussion Papers dp697, Financial Markets Group.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Effect of Risk Preferences on the Valuation and Incentives of Compensation Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 1209, CIRPEE.
- Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017.
"How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?,"
Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
- Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu, 2009. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-076/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Tobias Huber & Johannes G. Jaspersen & Andreas Richter & Dennis Strümpel, 2023. "On the change of risk aversion in wealth: a field experiment in a closed economic system," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(1), pages 1-26, March.
Articles
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023.
"The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring,"
Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021. "The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2020.
"Downside risk-neutral probabilities,"
Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 65-77, April.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2015. "Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities," Cahiers de recherche 1521, CIRPEE.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 2016. "Downside risk neutral probabilities," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118980, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019.
"The informativeness principle without the first-order approach,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 743-755.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102226, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2018.
"The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium,"
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 1297-1339, June.
Cited by:
- Lucas W. Davis and Catherine Hausman, 2020.
"Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?,"
The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 6), pages 157-180.
- Lucas W. Davis & Catherine Hausman, 2018. "Are Energy Executives Rewarded For Luck?," NBER Working Papers 25391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Olaolu Richard Olayeni, 2020. "A new perspective into the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance: evidence from Nigeria’s listed firms," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 22(2), pages 250-277, December.
- Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Ademola Obafemi Young & Xuan Vinh Vo & Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan, 2022. "Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3386-3403, December.
- Giorgio Barba Navaretti & Davide Castellani & Fabio Pieri, 2022. "CEO age, shareholder monitoring, and the organic growth of European firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 361-382, June.
- Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Hu, Gang & Li, Yingzhen & Xie, Jing, 2021. "Institutional trading, information production, and forced CEO turnovers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
- Lucas W. Davis and Catherine Hausman, 2020.
"Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?,"
The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 6), pages 157-180.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018.
"Does improved information improve incentives?,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102227, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018.
"The optimal timing of CEO compensation,"
Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017.
"Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 14-16.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Post-Print halshs-02292785, HAL.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2015.
"Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation,"
The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(15), pages 1357-1373, December.
Cited by:
- Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016.
"Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
5851, CESifo.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," Working Papers 883, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018. "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 16, pages 453-485, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- François Desmoulins-Lebeault & Luc Meunier, 2018. "Moment Risks: Investment for Self and for a Firm," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 15(4), pages 242-266, December.
- Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Sandrine Spaeter, 2018.
"Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing,"
Post-Print
halshs-02292797, HAL.
- Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing," Working Papers of BETA 2016-22, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016.
"Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
5851, CESifo.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015.
"Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Bouvard, Matthieu & Chaigneau, Pierre & Motta, Adolfo, 2012. "Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the financial system: rollover risk and crises," FMG Discussion Papers dp700, Financial Markets Group.
- Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Cahiers de recherche 1206, CIRPEE.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013.
"Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion,"
Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche 1208, CIRPEE.
- Pierre Chaigneau, 2011. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," FMG Discussion Papers dp693, Financial Markets Group.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2011. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119059, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013.
"Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation,"
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 778-789.
Cited by:
- Neus, Werner, 2014. "Eigenkapitalnormen, Boni und Risikoanreize in Banken," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(2), pages 92-107.
- Cerasi, Vittoria & Deininger, Sebastian M. & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Oliviero, Tommaso, 2020.
"How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation,"
Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
- Vittoria Cerasi & Sebastian M. Deininger & Leonardo Gambacorta & Tommaso Oliviero, 2018. "How Post-crisis Regulation Has Affected Bank CEO Compensation," CSEF Working Papers 493, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Gambacorta, Leonardo & Cerasi, Vittoria & Deininger, Sebastian M. & Oliviero, Tommaso, 2017. "How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 12008, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vittoria Cerasi & Sebastian M Deininger & Leonardo Gambacorta & Tommaso Oliviero, 2017. "How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation," BIS Working Papers 630, Bank for International Settlements.
- Vittoria, Cerasi & Sebastian, Deininger & Leonardo, Gambacorta & Tommaso, Oliviero, 2017. "How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation," Working Papers 365, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2018.
- Carlos A. Arango & Oscar M. Valencia, 2015.
"Macro-Prudential Policy under Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility,"
Borradores de Economia
12695, Banco de la Republica.
- Carlos A. Arango & Oscar M. Valencia, 2015. "Macro-Prudential Policy under Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility," Borradores de Economia 878, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
- Gietl, Daniel & Kassner, Bernhard, 2020.
"Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Bailouts,"
Munich Reprints in Economics
84745, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Gietl, Daniel & Kassner, Bernhard, 2020. "Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Bailouts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 202-222.
- Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2014.
"Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation,"
MPRA Paper
59456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eberhard Feess & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2018. "Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 206-242, April.
- Albuquerque, Rui & Cabral, Luis & Guedes, Jose, 2016.
"Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
11693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rui Albuquerque & Luis Cabral & Jose Guedes, 2018. "Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk," Working Papers 18-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Rui Albuquerque & Luís Cabral & José Guedes, 2019. "Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(11), pages 4304-4342.
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"Governance, efficiency and risk taking in Chinese banking,"
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NEP Fields
NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 15 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.- NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (9) 2012-04-10 2012-06-05 2014-02-08 2014-12-19 2014-12-29 2014-12-29 2020-04-13 2021-05-10 2023-04-03. Author is listed
- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (9) 2014-12-03 2014-12-19 2014-12-24 2014-12-29 2014-12-29 2014-12-29 2020-04-13 2021-05-10 2023-04-03. Author is listed
- NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (8) 2012-04-10 2012-04-10 2012-06-05 2014-02-08 2014-12-03 2014-12-19 2014-12-29 2014-12-29. Author is listed
- NEP-BEC: Business Economics (4) 2012-04-10 2012-06-05 2014-02-08 2021-05-17
- NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (3) 2012-04-10 2014-12-24 2014-12-29
- NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (2) 2021-05-17 2023-04-03
- NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2015-11-21 2020-04-13
- NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2012-04-10
- NEP-CBA: Central Banking (1) 2012-04-10
- NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2020-04-13
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