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Content
March 1977, Volume 29, Issue 2
- 129-137 Some limitations of the groves-ledyard optimal mechanism
by Joseph Greenberg & Robert Mackay & Nicolaus Tideman - 139-143 Reply to comments by Tidemand and Tullock and Greenberg, Mackay and Tideman on some limitations of demand revealing processes
by Theodore Groves & John Ledyard
March 1977, Volume 29, Issue 1
- 1-18 Constitutional power in experimental health service and delivery systems
by J. Coleman & S. Wu & S. Feld - 19-35 Donor optimization and the food stamp program
by J. Fred Giertz & Dennis Sullivan - 37-51 Bureaucratic compliance as a game on the unit square
by Gary Miller - 53-71 Equal access vs. Selective access: A critique of public goods theory
by Kenneth Goldin - 73-84 Prisoner's dilemma, logrolling and cyclical group preferences
by Peter Bernholz - 85-93 Spillovers, migration and public school expenditures: The repetition of an experiment
by Kenneth Greene - 95-107 Economic theory of the constitutional separation of powers
by Morris Silver - 109-125 A competitive model of local government organization: Implications for the process of community formation within metropolitan regions
by Robert Premus - 127-130 Revenue structure, fiscal illusion and budgetary choice: Comment
by Marilyn Flowers - 131-132 Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice: Reply
by Richard Wagner - 133-137 More on the vote winning and vote losing qualities of minimum wage laws
by William Keech - 139-141 The appeal of minimum wage laws: A dynamic analysis
by Randall Holcombe & John Metcalf - 143-147 Shifting public choice on minimum wages
by E. West - 149-153 Pareto-optimality and gains-from-trade: A public choice interpretation
by Charles Rowley & Martin Walker & Brian Beavis - 155-156 The electoral college and the rational vote: A correction
by James Kau & Paul Rubin
December 1976, Volume 28, Issue 1
- 1-15 Partial justification of the Borda count
by Duncan Black - 17-35 Electoral strategy under open voting: Evidence from England 1832–1880
by Jeremy Mitchell - 37-53 A modest proposal for election reform
by Burton Abrams & Russell Settle - 55-66 Social pressure and contributions to health charities
by Stephen Long - 67-78 Endogenous bargaining power and the theory of small group collective choice
by Z. Spindler - 79-88 Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle
by Peter Fishburn & William Gehrlein - 89-98 The existence of group preference functions
by Bengt Hansson - 99-105 Polluters' profit and political response: The dynamics of rights creation
by Warren Samuels & A. Allan Schmid - 107-111 A comment on “single-peakedness and guttman scales: Concept and measurement”
by Bernard Grofman - 113-116 Incomplete information, noisy signals, and uncertainty-averse voting in political elections: A note
by Peter Coughlin - 117-119 A note on nonwhite migration, welfare levels, and the political process
by Richard Cebula
September 1976, Volume 27, Issue 1
- 1-12 The American experiment in constitutional choice
by Vincent Ostrom - 13-19 Comments on Vincent Ostrom's paper
by William Riker & Vincent Ostrom - 21-39 Locational logrolling and citizen support of municipal bond proposals
by J. Archer & David Reynolds - 41-58 Identification of preference for election outcomes from aggregate voting data
by Anthony Barkume - 59-70 Public sector decision making and the technology of consumption
by Allan Maslove - 71-80 The effects of industry concentration and regulation on contributions in three 1972 U. S. senate campaigns
by Russell Pittman - 81-89 The determinants of voter participation: A more general model
by Russell Settle & Buron Abrams - 91-96 State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors
by W. Crain & Robert Tollison - 97-99 Collusion in spatial models of party competition
by Reiner Dinkel - 101-107 The electoral college and the rational vote
by James Kau & Paul Rubin - 109-111 Rotc service commitments: A comment
by Samuel Kleinman - 113-114 Rotc service commitments: A reply
by Harold Bierman & L. Thomas - 115-119 Costs of voting and nonvoting
by Richard Niemi - 121-126 Turnout, rational abstention and campaign effort
by Leslie Seidle & David Miller - 127-128 The theory of environmental policy
by Paul Portney - 129-130 Redistribution and the welfare system
by Alan Reynolds - 131-131 The economics of crime and law enforcement
by Gordon Tullock - 133-134 Neighborhood organization and interest group processes
by Barry Keating
June 1976, Volume 26, Issue 1
- 1-18 Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles
by William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn - 19-27 The voter's paradox and the homogeneity of individual preference orders
by R. Abrams - 29-49 The kernel and payoffs in European government coalitions
by Norman Schofield - 51-58 Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
by Jean Blin & Mark Satterthwaite - 59-74 A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action
by John Chamberlin - 75-87 Further results on path independence, quasitransitivity, and social choice
by Robert Parks - 89-103 Sequential decision making: A model
by Barbara Deckard - 105-106 Global and local equilibrium in majority voting
by Amoz Kats & Shmuel Nitzan - 107-115 A stochastic model of the committee decision process
by P. Rice - 117-118 Reply to Nicholas R. Miller
by Peter Bernholz - 119-127 A note on incompetence
by Howard Margolis - 129-134 Natural equilibrium in the bush-mayer model of anarchy: A dynamic analysis
by Koji Okuguchi - 135-140 The measurement of power in voting bodies: A comment on Kushner and Urken
by Prafulla Joglekar - 141-143 Some further comments on modeling power in voting bodies
by Harvey Kushner & Arnold Urken - 145-150 A note on clique avoidance in repeated jury selection from among a fixed pool of jurors
by Bernard Grofman & Scott Feld
March 1976, Volume 25, Issue 1
- 1-17 The impact of decision rules in multi-candidate campaigns
by Richard Joslyn - 19-30 Voting methods: A simulation
by William Ludwin - 31-44 Voter's paradox and logrolling
by Terry Sullivan - 45-61 Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice
by Richard Wagner - 63-64 Local government policies and migration: Comment
by Robert Kohn - 65-67 Local government policies and migration: Reply and extension
by Richard Cebula - 69-73 A comment on the economics of campaign funds
by Jonathan Silberman - 75-77 A rejoinder to Silberman
by William Welch - 79-80 Entropy and size, a clarification
by R. Auster - 81-82 Adam smith on public choice
by James Buchanan - 83-89 Endogenous bandwagon and underdog effects in a rational choice model
by Manfred Gartner - 91-93 Book reviews
by Charles Clotfelter - 95-99 Book reviews
by David Davies & Gordon Tullock - 101-111 Book reviews
by David Friedman & Mark Blaug & R. Cunningham
December 1975, Volume 24, Issue 1
- 1-12 Political contribution and policy — Some extensions
by Benjamin Bental & Uri Ben-Zion - 13-26 A theory of exchange, philanthropy and appropriation
by Albert Danielsen - 27-42 The theory of agency
by Barry Mitnick - 43-49 Information and voting: An empirical note
by Robert Tollison & Mark Crain & Paul Pautler - 51-57 Bureaucratic performance and budgetary reward
by Ronald Warren - 59-70 Optimal city size, the economic theory of clubs and exclusionary zoning
by Oscar Fisch - 71-92 The collective allocation of commodities in a democratic society
by Michael Lovell - 93-100 Social preference ordering in a probabilistic voting model
by Shmuel Nitzan - 101-109 Vote trading and Pareto efficiency
by Thomas Schwartz - 111-114 A note on unconditional probabilities and the voter's paradox
by James Buckley
September 1975, Volume 23, Issue 1
- 1-10 Price externalities influence public policy
by Kenneth Goldin - 11-23 Individual system preference
by Alexander Groth & Robert Curry - 25-34 The private allocation of public funds
by G. Philpotts - 35-48 Pricing public goods
by Bruce Scherr & Emerson Babb - 49-53 Experimenting with public goods pricing
by Edward Clarke - 55-67 A clear test of rational voting
by Jeffrey Smith - 69-73 Is a paretian liberal really impossible
by Peter Bernholz - 75-79 A note on the probability of a tied election
by Nathaniel Beck - 81-85 The possibility of double-peaked preference rankings for public school expenditures
by Marilyn Flowers - 87-94 The probability of intransitive majority rule
by Dean Jamison - 95-100 Bureaucratic profits, migration costs, and the consolidation of local government
by Dolores Martin & Richard McKenzie - 101-108 The rational behavior theory of voter participation
by Jonathan Silberman & Garey Durden - 109-114 Rotc service commitments
by L. Thomas & Harold Bierman - 115-120 Budgetary cutbacks, political promises and the unemployment problem
by James Yeager - 121-126 Utopia, the minimal state, and entitlement
by James Buchanan
June 1975, Volume 22, Issue 1
- 1-22 Candidate support functions in the 1968 election
by John Aldrich - 23-35 Income distribution under majority rule and alternative taxation criteria
by Donald Campbell - 37-53 Voting models incorporating interactions between voters
by Robert May & Brian Martin - 55-78 Congressional committee assignments
by Kenneth Shepsle - 79-89 Rational choice, light guessing and the gambler's fallacy
by Rebecca Morrison & Peter Ordeshook - 91-102 Inessential games and non-imposed solutions to allocation problems
by Charles Bird - 103-106 Voting with endogenous preferences
by J. Yeabsley - 107-111 Social choice theory and citizens' intransitive weak preference—A paradox
by Dénnis Packard
March 1975, Volume 21, Issue 1
- 1-14 Voting behavior, efficiency, and equity
by Yoram Barzel & Robert Deacon - 15-25 Bureaucrats and public goods
by Walter Hettich - 27-39 Viability, preference, and coalitions in the french election of 1951
by Howard Rosenthal - 41-51 Competing for aid
by Gordon Tullock - 53-67 The logic of bureaucratic back scratching
by Robert Goodin - 69-78 Progressive tax reform and majority voting
by P. Pestieau - 79-90 On the form of special interest legislation
by Paul Rubin - 91-97 Self-generating growth in public programs
by Richard Craswell - 99-103 A comment on ‘democratic theory: A preliminary mathematical model.’
by Bernard Grofman - 105-106 Institutional entropy
by Barry Keating & Maryann Keating - 107-110 Logrolling and the arrow paradox: A note
by Nicholas Miller - 111-113 Is a paretian liberal really impossible: A reply
by Amartya Sen - 115-116 A comment on McCaleb's “The size principle and collective-consumption payoffs to political coalitions”
by Richard Stoll - 117-122 Leibenstein's bandwagon effect as applied to voting
by Charles Zech - 123-124 Reviews
by Jeffrey Smith
December 1974, Volume 20, Issue 1
- 1-16 Models for the optimal allocation of funds over N constituencies during an election campaign
by W. Cook & M. Kirby & S. Mehndiratta - 17-32 Monopolistic trading economies: A case of governmental control
by Amoz Kats - 33-45 Single-peakedness and guttman scales: Concept and measurement
by Richard Niemi & Herbert Weisberg - 47-62 A model of regulatory agency behavior
by Milton Russell & Robert Shelton - 63-81 Collective consumption of private goods
by Robert Spann - 83-97 The economics of campaign funds
by William Welch - 99-107 Is a paretian liberal really impossible?
by Peter Bernholz - 109-111 Potential theft as indirect taxation
by Richard Cebula & Paul Gatons - 113-116 The cost of internal organization: A suggested simplification
by Andrew Gold - 117-128 The economic theory of representative government: A review
by Jean-Luc Migué - 129-133 The economic theory of representative government: A reply
by Albert Breton - 135-141 Book reviews
by Russell Hardin & Richard Merelman & Wilber Chaffee
September 1974, Volume 19, Issue 1
- 1-42 Aneconomic analysis of government ownership and reculation
by Louis Alessi - 43-61 The carrot and the stick
by Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer - 63-75 An experiment in public choice
by J. Giertz - 77-83 The Gpitpc and institutional entropy
by R. Auster - 85-93 Local government policies and migration
by Richard Cebula - 95-105 Mixed goods and bads
by Bruce Yandle - 107-109 Fiscal preference and balanced budget fiscal policy
by Ryan Amacher & Robert Tollison - 111-115 Economic theory of democracy
by Michael Boss - 117-120 The fate of solzhenitsyn
by Pham Chung - 121-122 Transaction costs, uncertainty, and externalities
by Adam Gifford - 123-126 Laborintensity, productivity, and the growth of the federal sector
by William Orzechowski - 127-131 Dynamic hypothesis on bureaucracy
by Gordon Tullock - 133-137 Vote earning versus vote losing properties of minimum wage laws
by E. West - 137-138 More on minimum wages and political clout
by Frank Steindl - 139-150 Reviews
by Anatol Rapoport & Howard Tuckman & John Ferejohn & Bruce Buchanan & Robert Butterworth
June 1974, Volume 18, Issue 1
- 1-23 Game-theoretic models of bloc-voting under proportional representation
by Howard Rosenthal - 25-40 Artificial markets and the theory of games
by W. Montgomery - 41-66 Cycles of risk
by Richard McKelvey & Jeff Richelson - 67-81 Voting behavior and aggregate policy targets
by Susan Lepper - 83-92 On social restriction of individual freedom
by Rubin Saposnik - 93-105 The calculus of rational choice
by William Stratmann - 107-126 Group size, group homo-geneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under cournot behavior
by Martin McGuire - 127-131 Reviews
by John Chamberlin & Gordon Tullock
March 1974, Volume 17, Issue 1
- 1-10 On money, votes, and policy in a democratic society
by Uri Ben-Zion & Zeev Eytan - 11-25 When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be
by Steven Brams & John Heilman - 27-47 Toward a general theory of managerial discretion
by Jean-Luc Migué & Gérard Bélanger & William Niskanen - 49-62 Some observations on the political economy of property tax reform
by Ralph Miner - 63-71 Political revolution and repression: An economic approach
by Morris Silver - 73-83 A description and explanation of citizen participation in a canadian municipality
by Mark Sproule-Jones - 85-91 Bargaining costs and social choice under uncertainty
by A. Pinto Barbosa - 93-97 Pareto optimal growth
by John Blair & Walter Chatfield - 99-101 Hegel on the calculus of voting
by James Buchanan - 103-106 Economic competition and political competition: Comments and corrections
by Noel Edelson - 107-109 The size principle and collective-consumption payoffs to political coalitions
by Thomas McCaleb - 111-113 Dynamic consistency in constitutions
by John Yeabsley - 115-129 Reviews
by Donald Wittman & Bruno Frey & Richard Rosett & Ray Whitman & Gordon Tullock & David Marwick & John Wanat & George Furstenberg & Oran Young
September 1973, Volume 16, Issue 1
- 1-15 Efficiency in the provision of fire services
by Rogers Ahlbrandt - 17-26 Democratic organization: A preliminary mathematical model
by Raphael Kazmann - 27-41 Normative assumptions in the study of public choice
by Duncan MacRae - 43-50 A note on the empirical nature of the taxpayer rebellion
by John Mikesell & John Blair - 51-58 Is the act of voting rational?
by Yoram Barzel & Eugene Silberberg - 59-71 Some simple economics of voting and not voting
by R. Tollison & T. Willett - 73-75 A note on collective goods and the theory of political entrepreneurship
by Jeffrey Richelson - 77-80 The rhodesian constitution and predictions for political stability
by Ewen Wilson - 81-89 The economic theory of politics: A survey of german contributions
by Bruno Frey & Rene Frey - 91-97 Reviews
by James Buchanan & Winston Bush & Louis Alessi & Warren Samuels - 98-98 Collective Goods and Collective Decision Mechanisms
by Richard Auster & Morris Silver
June 1973, Volume 15, Issue 1
- 1-1 Editor's note
by Gordon Tullock - 1-17 Indifference, alientation and rational decisions
by Richard Brody & Benjamin Page - 19-48 Stable outcomes in majority rule voting games
by Judith Sloss - 49-75 An economic approach to social choice
by Trout Rader - 77-85 Measuring power in voting bodies
by Harvey Kushner & Arnold Urken - 87-95 Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities
by Peter Bernholz - 97-102 The hunting of the paradox
by Roger Marz & Thomas Casstevens & Harold Casstevens - 103-117 The paradox of voting
by Thomas Hansen & Barry Prince - 119-119 Communications
by I. Good
March 1973, Volume 14, Issue 1
- 1-17 Collective goods and collective decision mechanisms
by Richard Auster & Morris Silver - 19-42 The control of politicians: An economic model
by Robert Barro - 43-67 Pareto desirable redistribution: The non-altruistic dimension
by Geoffrey Brennan - 69-82 The institutional structure of externality
by James Buchanan - 83-99 On the incentives of regulators: The case of taxicabs
by Ross Eckert - 101-107 A diagrammatic exposition of an economic theory of imperialism
by Paul Roberts & Alvin Rabushka - 109-116 A note on revenue sharing and the theory of public expenditures
by Sidney Carroll