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Social pressure and contributions to health charities

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  • Stephen Long

Abstract

On the whole the evidence lends support to the hypothesis that social pressure affects the level of charitable contributions. We find, however, that the form of the pressure is an important determinant of the size of health contributions. Personal forms of solicitation appear to increase contributions, relative to impersonal forms such as media advertisements and mail campaigns. Within the class of personal solicitations, we find that pressure to give which is exerted by friends is more effective than requrests by strangers. Limited evidence was also found that some workplace relationships result in more effective fund-raising when compared to solicitations by strangers. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1976

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Long, 1976. "Social pressure and contributions to health charities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 55-66, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:28:y:1976:i:1:p:55-66
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718457
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Reinstein David A, 2011. "Does One Charitable Contribution Come at the Expense of Another?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-54, June.
    2. Meer, Jonathan, 2011. "Brother, can you spare a dime? Peer pressure in charitable solicitation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 926-941.
    3. Jonathan Meer, "undated". "Brother Can You Spare a Dime? Peer Effects in Charitable Solicitation," Discussion Papers 08-035, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Sarah Jacobson & Ragan Petrie, 2014. "Favor trading in public good provision," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(3), pages 439-460, September.
    5. Joseph Cordes & Robert Goldfarb & Harry Watson, 1986. "The relative efficiency of private and public transfers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 29-45, January.
    6. Diamond, Peter, 2006. "Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 897-919, May.
    7. Burton Abrams & Mark Schitz, 1978. "The ‘crowding-out’ effect of governmental transfers on private charitable contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 29-39, March.
    8. Erik Schokkaert & Luc Ootegem, 2000. "Preference Variation and Private Donations," International Economic Association Series, in: L.-A. Gérard-Varet & S.-C. Kolm & J. Mercier Ythier (ed.), The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, chapter 3, pages 78-95, Palgrave Macmillan.
    9. Reinstein, David, 2006. "Does One Contribution Come at the Expense of Another? Empirical Evidence on Substitution Between Charitable Donations," Economics Discussion Papers 2938, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    10. Lawrence B. Lindsey & Richard Steinberg, 1990. "Joint Crowdout: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Federal Grants on State Government Expenditures and Charitable Donations," NBER Working Papers 3226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Richard Steinberg, 1986. "Charitable Giving as a Mixed Public/Private Good: Implications for Tax Policy," Public Finance Review, , vol. 14(4), pages 415-431, October.

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