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Monitoring and Pay

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jacoby, Hanan G. & Mansuri, Ghazala, 2009. "Incentives, supervision, and sharecropper productivity," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 232-241, March.
  2. IKEUCHI Kenta & FUKAO Kyoji & Cristiano PERUGINI, 2021. "Establishment Size, Workforce Composition and the College Wage Gap in Japan," Discussion papers 21022, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  3. Marcus Dittrich & Silvio Städter, 2021. "Monitoring ’lemons’: why lower productivity workers are sometimes monitored more closely," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(9), pages 737-741, May.
  4. Wunnava, Phanindra V., 2017. "Firm Size and Union Threat Effects across Genders: Evidence from NLSY79," GLO Discussion Paper Series 45, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
  5. Dennis Dittrich & Martin Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  6. Sessions, John G., 2008. "Wages, supervision and sharing," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 653-672, November.
  7. Ross, Stephen L. & Zenou, Yves, 2008. "Are shirking and leisure substitutable? An empirical test of efficiency wages based on urban economic theory," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 498-517, September.
  8. Sang‐Moon Hahm & Katarina Mayer, 2011. "Equilibrium unemployment as a discipline device when finding employment is costly," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(2), pages 709-717, May.
  9. Haiwen Zhou, 2020. "Monitoring Intensity and Technology Choice in a Model of Unemployment," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 46(3), pages 504-520, June.
  10. Wu Joseph S. K. & Ho Chi Pui, 2017. "The Shapiro-Stiglitz Model with Non-constant Marginal Utility," Open Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 36-48, August.
  11. Eduard Alonso‐Paulí, 2022. "Incentives versus monitoring within the firm: Understanding Codes of Corporate Governance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(3), pages 813-828, April.
  12. Pablo González, 2002. "Profit Sharing Reconsidered: Efficiency Wages and Renegotiation Costs," Documentos de Trabajo 151, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  13. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
  14. Ourania Karakosta & Nikos Tsakiris, 2009. "Indirect Tax Reforms and Public Goods under Imperfect Competition," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
  15. Kirkegaard, René, 2017. "A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
  16. John G. Sessions & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2014. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," Research in Labor Economics, in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 105-162, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
  17. Bruno Maria Parigi & Loriana Pelizzon & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2013. "Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium," CESifo Working Paper Series 4496, CESifo.
  18. Sessions, John G. & Skåtun, John D., 2015. "Shirking, Standards and the Probability of Detection," IZA Discussion Papers 8863, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  19. Kocher, Martin & Dittrich, Dennis, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 5962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Sarah Brown & Robert McNabb & Karl Taylor, 2006. "Firm Performance, Worker Commitment and Loyalty," Working Papers 2006005, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2006.
  21. Tetteh, Rebecca & Mohammed, Safura & Ahmed Azumah, Ayisha, 2017. "What is the effect of wages and supervision on productivity? The perspective of Sunyani Technical University staff," MPRA Paper 81473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. M Guerrazzi, 2008. "A Dynamic Efficiency-Wage Model with Continuous Effort and Externalities," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 13(2), pages 37-58, September.
  23. John G. Sessions & John D. Skåtun, 2018. "Shirking, Standards And The Probability Of Detection," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 103-118, April.
  24. Christos Bilanakos & John S. Heywood & John G. Sessions & Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, 2018. "Does Delegation Increase Worker Training?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1089-1115, April.
  25. Chen Liang & Yili Hong & Bin Gu, 2016. "Effects of IT-enabled Monitoring on Labor Contracting in Online Platforms: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Working Papers 16-01, NET Institute.
  26. Fallesen, Peter, 2016. "Downward spiral: The impact of out-of-home placement on paternal welfare dependency," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 45-55.
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