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The Advantages of Imprecise Information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Liu, Ting & Wang, Tao, 2018. "Information Acquisition, signaling and learning in duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 155-191.
  2. Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, 2010. "The Quality Of Information And Incentives For Effort," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 642-660, September.
  3. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2002. "Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 151-160, September.
  4. Neubauer, Silke, 1997. "Interdivisional information sharing: the strategic advantage of knowing nothing," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Dynamics FS IV 97-33, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  5. Lemus, Ana B. & Moreno, Diego, 2020. "Strategic incentives for keeping one set of books under the Arm’s Length Principle," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 78-90.
  6. Carolyn M. Callahan & E. Ann Gabriel, 1998. "The Differential Impact of Accurate Product Cost Information in Imperfectly Competitive Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 419-455, December.
  7. Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods," Discussion Paper Series dp349, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  8. Nelson Granados & Alok Gupta & Robert J. Kauffman, 2010. "Research Commentary---Information Transparency in Business-to-Consumer Markets: Concepts, Framework, and Research Agenda," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(2), pages 207-226, June.
  9. Thomas Gehrig & Werner Güth & René Levínský, 2013. "On insider trading and belief evolution," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 767-781, September.
  10. Lin, C.-Y. Cynthia & Muelegger, Erich, 2007. "Using Approximations to Competitors’ Private Information: An Application of Cognitive Costs to Strategic Behavior," Working Paper Series rwp07-025, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  11. Richard Arnott, 1992. "Information and Usage of Congestible Facilities Under Free Access," Discussion Papers 974, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Roy, Nilanjan, 2017. "Action revision, information and collusion in an experimental duopoly market," MPRA Paper 77033, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Tim Willems, 2017. "Actively Learning by Pricing: A Model of an Experimenting Seller," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2216-2239, September.
  14. Lin, C.-Y. Cynthia & Muehlegger, Erich J., 2013. "On the use of heuristics to approximate competitors’ private information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 10-23.
  15. Barrachina, Alex & Tauman, Yair & Urbano, Amparo, 2014. "Entry and espionage with noisy signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 127-146.
  16. Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cunat, 2007. "Information Gathering Externalities in Product Markets," Working Papers 07-18, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  17. Dimitrova, Magdalena & Schlee, Edward E., 2003. "Monopoly, competition and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1623-1642, December.
  18. Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2007. "Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 94-120, January.
  19. Yukiko Hirao, 2017. "Firms’ Information Acquisition with Heterogeneous Consumers and Trend," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(3), pages 323-344, May.
  20. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Imperfect competition and quality signalling," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 163-183, March.
  21. Lin, C.Y. Cynthia & Muehlegger, Erich J., 2009. "Heuristic Strategies, Firm Behavior and Industry Information," Working Papers 225898, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  22. Amparo Urbano & María Dolores Alepuz Domenech, 1991. "Duopoly Experimentation: Cournot And Bertrand Competition," Working Papers. Serie AD 1991-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  23. Markus Christen, 2005. "Research Note---Cost Uncertainty Is Bliss: The Effect of Competition on the Acquisition of Cost Information for Pricing New Products," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(4), pages 668-676, April.
  24. Hui Li & Feng Zhu, 2021. "Information Transparency, Multihoming, and Platform Competition: A Natural Experiment in the Daily Deals Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(7), pages 4384-4407, July.
  25. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Shin, Jhinyoung, 1999. "Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 109-135, January.
  26. Dan Bernhardt & Bart Taub, 2015. "Learning about common and private values in oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 66-85, March.
  27. Lemus Torres, Ana Belén, 2011. "Strategic incentives for kepping one set of books under the Arm's Length Principle," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1135, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  28. Tapan Biswas & Jolian McHardy, 2010. "Strategic behaviour of firms in a duopoly and the impact of extending the patenting period," Working Papers 2010014, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
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