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On Coalition Incentive Compatibility

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Deckelbaum, Alan & Micali, Silvio, 2017. "Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 83-93.
  2. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
  3. Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J., 2004. "Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms," Working papers 4, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  4. Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2022. "Ambiguous Social Choice Functions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 660, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  5. Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2012. "Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1300-1312.
  6. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Discussion Papers 2020/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  7. Manimay Sengupta, 1996. "Informed Planner, Decentralized Decisions And Incentive Compatibility," Discussion Paper Series 12, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Oct 1996.
  8. Martin Hellwig, 2015. "Financial Stability and Monetary Policy," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  9. David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2013. "Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000000713, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Eric Maskin, 2004. "Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 913-923, September.
  11. Michel Breton & Vera Zaporozhets, 2009. "On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(2), pages 287-309, August.
  12. Francesco Feri & Anita Gantner & Wolfgang Höchtl & Rupert Sausgruber, 2013. "The pivotal mechanism revisited: some evidence on group manipulation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(1), pages 23-51, March.
  13. Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M., 1992. "Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies : Characterization and existence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-35.
  14. Jon X. Eguia & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 2811-2828, September.
  15. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  16. Asseyer, Andreas, 2016. "Optimal Information Disclosure and Collusion," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145779, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  17. Laffont, Jean Jacques, 1997. "Collusion et information asymétrique," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(4), pages 595-609, décembre.
  18. Klijn Flip, 2019. "Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-9, January.
  19. Schummer, James, 2000. "Manipulation through Bribes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 180-198, April.
  20. Martin Bichler & Johannes Knörr & Felipe Maldonado, 2023. "Pricing in Nonconvex Markets: How to Price Electricity in the Presence of Demand Response," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(2), pages 652-675, June.
  21. Vitalik Buterin & Zoë Hitzig & E. Glen Weyl, 2019. "A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5171-5187, November.
  22. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
  23. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2017. "Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 71-83.
  24. Hagen, Martin, 2023. "Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 281-298.
  25. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
  26. Jing Chen & Silvio Micali, 2016. "Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-19, October.
  27. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  28. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2010. "Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(3), pages 455-470, March.
  29. Gaurab Aryal & Maria Florencia Gabrielli, 2023. "Is Collusion-proof Procurement Expensive?," Working Papers 248, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
  30. Hao Chung & Elaine Shi, 2021. "Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design," Papers 2111.03151, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
  31. Jean‐Jacques Laffont, 1988. "Hidden Gaming in Hierarchies: Facts and Models," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 64(4), pages 295-306, December.
  32. Gaurab Aryal & Maria F. Gabrielli, 2015. "Is Collusion-Proof Procurement Expensive?," Papers 1508.05353, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
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