Is Collusion-proof Procurement Expensive?
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More about this item
Keywords
Procurements; Collusion-Proof Auction; Local Polynomial Estimator;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
- C4 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2023-06-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-DES-2023-06-26 (Economic Design)
- NEP-IND-2023-06-26 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2023-06-26 (Regulation)
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