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Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Stefano DellaVigna & M. Daniele Paserman, 2005. "Job Search and Impatience," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(3), pages 527-588, July.
  2. Robert Breunig & Deborah A. Cobb‐Clark & Yvonne Dunlop & Marion Terrill, 2003. "Assisting the Long‐Term Unemployed: Results from a Randomised Trial," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(244), pages 84-102, March.
  3. David Card & Richard B. Freeman, 2004. "What Have Two Decades of British Economic Reform Delivered?," NBER Chapters, in: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980–2000, pages 9-62, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Dan A. Black & Mark C. Berger & Jeffrey A. Smith & Brett J. Noel, 1999. "Is the Threat of Training More Effective Than Training Itself? Experimental Evidence from the UI System," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9907, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  5. Philip K. Robins & Robert G. Spiegelman (ed.), 2001. "Reemployment Bonuses in the Unemployment Insurance System: Evidence from Three Field Experiments," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number rbuis, August.
  6. John Van Reenen, 2004. "Active Labor Market Policies and the British New Deal for the Young Unemployed in Context," NBER Chapters, in: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980–2000, pages 461-496, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, 1999. "The High-Pressure U.S. Labor Market of the 1990s," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 30(1), pages 1-88.
  8. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
  9. Daniel H. Klepinger & Terry R. Johnson & Jutta M. Joesch, 2002. "Effects of Unemployment Insurance Work-Search Requirements: The Maryland Experiment," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 3-22, October.
  10. Barbara Petrongolo, 2007. "What Are the Long-Term Effects of UI? Evidence from the UK JSA Reform," CEP Discussion Papers dp0841, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  11. Dan A. Black & Jeffrey A. Smith & Mark C. Berger & Brett J. Noel, 2002. "Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective than the Services Themselves? Experimental Evidence from the UI System," NBER Working Papers 8825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Emmanuel Duguet & Florent Frémigacci & Yannick L’Horty, 2008. "Indemnisation du chômage et retour à l’emploi : un examen économétrique," Documents de recherche 08-07, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
  13. Guillaume Allegre, 2008. "L'expérimentation sociale des incitations financières à l'emploi : questions méthodologiques et leçons des expériences nord-américaines," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00973042, HAL.
  14. Van der Linden, Bruno & Dor, Eric, 1998. "The net effect of unemployment benefits, sanctions and training on aggregate unemployment outflows," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 07 Sep 2000.
  15. Fougère, Denis & Pradel, Jacqueline & Roger, Muriel, 2005. "Does Job-Search Assistance Affect Search Effort and Outcomes? A Microeconometric Analysis of Public versus Private Search Methods," IZA Discussion Papers 1825, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  16. Manning, Alan, 2004. "Monopsony and the efficiency of labour market interventions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 145-163, April.
  17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6148 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Petrongolo, Barbara, 2009. "The long-term effects of job search requirements: Evidence from the UK JSA reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1234-1253, December.
  19. Hesselius, Patrik & Johansson, Per & Larsson, Laura, 2005. "Monitoring sickness insurance claimants: evidence from a social experiment," Working Paper Series 2005:15, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  20. Johansson, Per, 2006. "Using internal replication to establish a treatment effect," Working Paper Series 2006:3, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  21. M. Daniele Paserman, 2008. "Job Search and Hyperbolic Discounting: Structural Estimation and Policy Evaluation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1418-1452, August.
  22. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6148 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Gray, Matthew & Hunter, Boyd, 2005. "Indigenous Job Search Success," MPRA Paper 1393, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Jeff Borland & Yi-Ping Tseng, 2003. "How Do Administrative Arrangements Affect Exit from Unemployment Payments? The Case of the Job Seeker Diary in Australia," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2003n27, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
  25. Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2001. "Alternative Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung: das Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten und des Vereinigten Königreichs," Kiel Working Papers 1032, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  26. Johansson, Per, 2008. "The importance of employer contacts: Evidence based on selection on observables and internal replication," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 350-369, June.
  27. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6148 is not listed on IDEAS
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