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Monitoring sickness insurance claimants: evidence from a social experiment

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Author Info

  • Hesselius, Patrik

    ()
    (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation)

  • Johansson, Per

    ()
    (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation)

  • Larsson, Laura

    (SNS - Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle)

Abstract

The paper exploits a unique social experiment carried out in 1988 in Sweden to identify the effect of monitoring on sickness absence. The treatment consists of postponing the first formal point of monitoring during a sickness absence spell, a requirement for a doctor’s certificate, from day eight to day fifteen. The experiment was conducted in two geographical areas, and the treatment group was randomized by birth date. The results show strong effects on sickness absence duration from extending the waiting period in both areas. On average, the durations increased by 6.6 percent. No effect on incidence of sickness absence is found. A heterogeneity analysis reveals that monitoring affects men more than women.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy in its series Working Paper Series with number 2005:15.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 19 Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published as Hesselius, Patrik, Per Johansson and Laura Hartman, 'Effects of eligibility screening in the sickness insurance: Evidence from a field experiment' in Labour Economics, 2013, pages 48-56.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2005_015

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Postal: IFAU, P O Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: (+46) 18 - 471 70 70
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Related research

Keywords: Absenteeism; sickness insurance; monitoring; social experiment;

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References

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  1. Alan B. Krueger & Bruce D. Meyer, 2002. "Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance," NBER Working Papers 9014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Holmlund, Bertil, 1998. " Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 113-41, March.
  3. Dolton, Peter & O'Neill, Donal, 1996. "Unemployment Duration and the Restart Effect: Some Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 387-400, March.
  4. Gerard van den Berg & Bas van der Klaauw, 2000. "Counseling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Social Experiment," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0972, Econometric Society.
  5. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory : A Survey of Some Recent Work," Working Papers 2002-11, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  6. Orley Ashenfelter & David Ashmore & Olivier Deschenes, 1999. "Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 6982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 1996. "Do economic incentives affect work absence? Empirical evidence using Swedish micro data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-218, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hägglund, Pathric, 2006. "Are there pre-programme effects of Swedish active labour market policies? Evidence from three randomised experiments," Working Paper Series 2006:2, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  2. Lindbeck, Assar & Palme, Mårten & Persson, Mats, 2007. "Social Interaction and Sickness Absence," Working Paper Series 725, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  3. Hesselius, Patrik & Johansson, Per & Nilsson, Peter, 2009. "Sick of your colleagues' absence?," Working Paper Series 2009:2, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  4. Assar Lindbeck, 2005. "Sustainable Social Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series 1594, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Engström, Per & Hägglund, Pathric & Johansson, Per, 2012. "Early Interventions and Disability Insurance: Experience from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 6553, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Hesselius, Patrik & Johansson, Per & Vikström, Johan, 2008. "Monitoring and norms in sickness insurance: empirical evidence from a natural experiment," Working Paper Series 2008:8, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  7. Forslund, Anders, 2009. "Labour supply incentives, income support systems and taxes in Sweden," Working Paper Series 2009:30, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  8. Carlsen, Benedicte, 2012. "From absence to absenteeism? A qualitative cross case study of teachers’ views on sickness absence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 129-136.

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