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Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
  2. Temel, Tugrul, 2011. "Industrial policy, collective action, and the direction of technological change," MPRA Paper 31917, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. James Lake & Maia Linask, 2015. "Costly distribution and the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 211-238, December.
  4. Hiroyuki Sano, 2014. "Reciprocal rent-seeking contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 575-596, March.
  5. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 329-335, March.
  6. T. Guse & B. Hehenkamp, 2006. "The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 323-352, December.
  7. John Morgan & Henrik Orzen & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Endogenous entry in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 435-463, October.
  8. Carpenter, Jeffrey, 2021. "The shape of warm glow: Field experimental evidence from a fundraiser," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 555-574.
  9. Martin Grossmann, 2021. "Asymmetric Opportunities After an Unsuccessful Sports Career," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(5), pages 587-612, June.
  10. William F. Shughart II, 1999. "The Reformer’s Dilemma," Public Finance Review, , vol. 27(5), pages 561-565, September.
  11. Grossmann, Martin & Dietl, Helmut, 2015. "Heterogeneous outside options in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 280-287.
  12. Hiroyuki Sano, 2009. "Imitative Learning in Tullock Contests: Does Overdissipation Prevail in the Long Run?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 365-383, September.
  13. Cugno, Franco & Ferrero, Mario, 2004. "Competition among volunteers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 637-654, September.
  14. John Morgan & Henrik Orzen & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Endogenous entry in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 435-463, October.
  15. Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Efficient rents 3 back to the bog," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 259-263, January.
  16. Roger Congleton, 1986. "Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 249-263, January.
  17. Lim, Wooyoung & Matros, Alexander, 2009. "Contests with a stochastic number of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 584-597, November.
  18. Aycinena, Diego & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
  19. Alexander Matros, 2007. "Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players," Working Paper 323, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Sep 2008.
  20. James Lake & Maia K. Linask, 2013. "The near-equivalence of tariffs and quotas," Departmental Working Papers 1305, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  21. Edward Millner & Michael Pratt, 1989. "An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 139-151, August.
  22. Robert Michaels, 1988. "The design of rent-seeking competitions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 17-29, January.
  23. Adarkwah Yaw Antwi & John Adams, 2003. "Rent-seeking Behaviour and its Economic Costs in Urban Land Transactions in Accra, Ghana," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 40(10), pages 2083-2098, September.
  24. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2017. "Using raffles to fund public goods: Lessons from a field experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 30-38.
  25. XiaoGang Che & Brad Humphreys, 2014. "Contests with a Prize Externality and Stochastic Entry," Working Papers 14-19, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  26. Richard Higgins & William Shughart & Robert Tollison, 1985. "Efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 247-258, January.
  27. Mark Gradstein, 1995. "Intensity Of Competition, Entry And Entry Deterrence In Rent Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 79-91, March.
  28. J. Smith & Shlomo Weber, 1989. "Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 153-166, May.
  29. Petros G. Sekeris & Kevin Siqueira, 2021. "Payoff-Improving Competition: Games with Negative Externalities," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(3), pages 455-474, May.
  30. William Corcoran & Gordon Karels, 1985. "Efficient rents 1 rent-seeking behavior in the long-run," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 227-246, January.
  31. S. Keith Berry, 2006. "Firm Incentives for Invention Prizes with Multiple Winners," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 83-95, Winter.
  32. Xiuqin Yang & Feng Liu & Hua Wang, 2023. "Complex Dynamic Analysis for a Rent-Seeking Game with Political Competition and Policymaker Costs," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-18, November.
  33. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2000. "Does jury bias matter?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 315-328, September.
  34. Jia, Hao & Sun, Ching-jen, 2021. "The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
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