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Does informative media commentary reduce politicians' incentives to pander?

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Takanori Adachi & Yoichi Hizen, 2014. "Political Accountability, Electoral Control and Media Bias," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 316-343, September.
  2. Stephane Wolton, 2019. "Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(3), pages 548-562, July.
  3. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2020. "Reputation and news suppression in the media industry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 240-271.
  4. Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 207-249, July.
  5. Hisashi Sawaki, 2017. "Ideology signaling in electoral politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 48-68, January.
  6. Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2021. "A Note on Asymmetric Policies: Pandering and State-specific Costs of Mismatch in Political Agency," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
  7. Sasso, Greg & Morelli, Massimo, 2021. "Bureaucrats under Populism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
  8. Hanzhe Li, 2022. "Transparency and Policymaking with Endogenous Information Provision," Papers 2204.08876, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
  9. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan & Landa, Dimitri, 2015. "Political accountability and sequential policymaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 95-108.
  10. Le Bihan, Patrick, 2015. "Popular Referendum and Electoral Accountability," IAST Working Papers 15-31, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
  11. Jon X. Eguia & Antonio Nicolò, 2011. "On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 234, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  12. Ilaria Petrarca, 2013. "No news is costly news: the link between the diffusion of the press and public spending," Working Papers 16/2013, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  13. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.
  14. Miura, Shintaro, 2019. "Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 306-338.
  15. Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico, 2022. "Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 132-143.
  16. Matsusaka, John G., 2017. "When Do Legislators Follow Constituent Opinion? Evidence from Matched Roll Call and Referendum Votes," Working Papers 264, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  17. Landa, Dimitri & Le Bihan, Patrick, 2015. "Policy Unbundling and Special Interest Politics," IAST Working Papers 15-32, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
  18. Anqi Li & Davin Raiha & Kenneth W. Shotts, 2019. "Propaganda, Alternative Media, and Accountability in Fragile Democracies," Papers 1909.11836, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
  19. Petrarca, Ilaria, 2014. "No news is costly news: The link between the diffusion of the press and public spending," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 68-85.
  20. Margherita Negri, 2017. "Good Politicians' Distorted Incentives," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201713, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.
  21. Philine Widmer & Sergio Galletta & Elliott Ash, 2022. "Media Slant is Contagious," Papers 2202.07269, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
  22. Izzo, Federica & Dewan, Torun & Wolton, Stephane, 2022. "Cumulative knowledge in the social sciences: The case of improving voters' information," MPRA Paper 112559, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Vlaicu, Razvan & Whalley, Alexander, 2016. "Hierarchical accountability in government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 85-99.
  24. Morelli, Massimo & Sasso, Greg, 2020. "Bureaucrats under Populism," CEPR Discussion Papers 14499, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Anqi Li & Lin Hu, 2020. "Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation," Papers 2009.03761, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
  26. Foerster, Manuel & Voss, Achim, 2022. "Believe me, I am ignorant, but not biased," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
  27. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2023. "Reputation and perverse transparency under two concerns," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  28. Bucciol, Alessandro, 2018. "False claims in politics: Evidence from the US," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 196-210.
  29. Betul Demirkaya, 2019. "What is opposition good for?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(2), pages 260-280, April.
  30. Giovanni Andreottola, 2020. "Flip-opping and Electoral Concerns," CSEF Working Papers 558, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  31. Patacconi, Andrea & Vikander, Nick, 2015. "A model of public opinion management," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 73-83.
  32. Warren, Patrick L., 2012. "Independent auditors, bias, and political agency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 78-88.
  33. Devdariani, Saba & Hirsch, Alexander V., 2023. "Voter attention and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
  34. Daniel Gibbs, 2023. "Individual accountability, collective decision-making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 524-552, December.
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