The Theory of Price Collars: The Linking of Prices in a Market Channel to Redress the Exercise of Market Power
AbstractThe marketing channels for many goods involve the production of a raw commodity that is processed and then distributed to retailers for sale to consumers. Either the processing industry or the retailing industry or both may exercise substantial market power ultimately against raw commodity suppliers or consumers, the disorganized (competitive) economic groups at the ends of the market channel. This paper develops a theory of price collars to regulate pricing in such a channel. Price collars link raw product, wholesale and retail prices but do not explicitly set such prices. For example, a wholesale price collar could limit the wholesale price to 140% of the raw commodity price, and a retail price collar could limit retail price to 130% of the wholesale price.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy in its series Food Marketing Policy Center Research Reports with number 091.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
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