Siesta: A theory of freelancing
AbstractI study the effect of fatigue and innate ability on performance in a model with incomplete contracts, lumpy tasks requiring multiple periods of work and stochastic productivity shocks. I find that increasing ability or reducing fatigue does not lead necessarily to more productive efficiency, since it may exacerbate the incentive for agents take "too much" on-the-job leisure. In a world with heterogenous agents, the problem may be ameliorated by the introduction of a dual labour market with free-lancers (who can take breaks at their discretion) and regular workers (who work on a fixed schedule).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics - University of Zurich in its series ECON - Working Papers with number 055.
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Breaks; leisure; productivity; freelancing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D0 - Microeconomics - - General
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices
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