Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Assessing Voluntary Commitments: Monitoring is Not Enough!

Contents:

Author Info

  • Böhringer, Christoph
  • Frondel, Manuel

Abstract

This paper deals with a special type of voluntary approach to protect the environment, for example, that we would like to term voluntary commitment. Its major characteristic is that it represents a unilateral declaration without a decisively active role of regulators. In other words, voluntary commitments are, by definition, not the result of intensive mutual negotiations between participants and regulators. By combining theoretical considerations on the economic rationale for the popularity of voluntary commitments with an investigation of principal conceptual and statistical problems regarding their empirical assessment, it seems unlikely that voluntary commitments generally trigger significant deviations from business-as-usual. This casts doubt on the effectiveness and, hence, the efficiency of this specific type of voluntary approach. Effectiveness, guaranteed through more demanding goals, requires intensive mutual negotiations – monitoring is not enough. --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23963/1/dp0262.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 02-62.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:1337

Contact details of provider:
Postal: L 7,1; D - 68161 Mannheim
Phone: +49/621/1235-01
Fax: +49/621/1235-224
Email:
Web page: http://www.zew.de/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Voluntary Agreements; Counterfactual; Evaluation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1999. "The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 158-175, September.
  2. Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
  3. Frondel, Manuel & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2001. "Evaluating Environmental Programs: The Perspective of Modern Evaluation Research," IZA Discussion Papers 397, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Arora Seema & Cason Timothy N., 1995. "An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 271-286, May.
  5. Khanna, Madhu, 2001. " Non-mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 291-324, July.
  6. Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, 1996. "Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 72(4), pages 413-432.
  7. Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers 843, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  8. Rennings, Klaus & Brockmann, Karl Ludwig & Bergmann, Heidi, 1997. "Voluntary Agreements in Environmental Protection - Experiences in Germany and Future Perspectives," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 97-04, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  9. Christoph Bohringer, 2002. "Climate Politics from Kyoto to Bonn: From Little to Nothing?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 51-71.
  10. Karine Nyborg, 2000. "Voluntary Agreements and Non-Verifiable Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(2), pages 125-144, October.
  11. Segerson, Kathleen & Miceli, Thomas J., 1998. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-130, September.
  12. Alberto Cavaliere, 2000. "Overcompliance and Voluntary Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(2), pages 195-202, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Norbert Eickhof, 2003. "Freiwillige Selbstverpflichtungen aus wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Sicht," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät 61, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  2. Konnola, Totti & Unruh, Gregory C. & Carrillo-Hermosilla, Javier, 2006. "Prospective voluntary agreements for escaping techno-institutional lock-in," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 239-252, May.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:1337. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.