Who should pay for certification?
AbstractWho does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification maximizes the certifier's profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be induced by the better informed party. The results are reflected in a case study from the automotive industry, but apply also to other markets - in particular the financial market. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 11-054.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Asymmetric information; certification; information acquisition; inspection; lemons; middlemen; signaling;
Other versions of this item:
- Konrad O. Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2011. "Who Should Pay for Certification?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3365, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stahl, Konrad & Strausz, Roland, 2010. "Who Should Pay for Certification?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 323, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Stahl, Konrad O & Strausz, Roland, 2011. "Who Should Pay for Certification?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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- Albano, Gian Luigi & Lizzeri, Alessandro, 2001. "Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(1), pages 267-83, February.
- Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Lovo, Stefano, 2013. "Credit Rating Industry: a Helicopter Tour of Stylized Facts and Recent Theories," IDEI Working Papers 762, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Lovo, Stefano, 2013. "Credit Rating Industry: a Helicopter Tour of Stylized Facts and Recent Theories," TSE Working Papers 13-376, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Jeon, Doh-Shin & Lovo, Stefano, 2013. "Credit rating industry: A helicopter tour of stylized facts and recent theories," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 643-651.
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