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Monetary policy under uncertain planning horizon

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  • Berlemann, Michael

Abstract

This note focuses on the role of the planning horizon in monetary policy games. We analyze the case of an uncertain horizon of the monetary policy game that has not been considered, yet. In addition to that we will - different from the basic Barro-Gordon-model - assume a quadratic loss function for the policy maker. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics in its series Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics with number 07/00.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuddps:0700

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Web page: http://www.tu-dresden.de/wiwi/
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  1. Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 123-125.
  2. Gartner, Manfred, 1997. " Time-Consistent Monetary Policy under Output Persistence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 429-37, September.
  3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1974. "Rational expectations and the theory of economic policy," Working Papers 29, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  6. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
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