Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Information cascades on the labor market

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kübler, Dorothea
  • Weizsäcker, Georg

Abstract

A model of herding behavior on the labor market is discussed where employers only receive signals with limited precision about the workers' types, but can observe previous employers' decisions. In particular, we study a situation where the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities, in the sense that the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the worker's type whereas the worker tries to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the worker's type, but he does follow his own signal if the worker's history is good. --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/62676/1/725944730.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes in its series SFB 373 Discussion Papers with number 2001,86.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200186

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Spandauer Str. 1,10178 Berlin
Phone: +49-30-2093-5708
Fax: +49-30-2093-5617
Email:
Web page: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Biewen, Martin & Steffes, Susanne, 2010. "Unemployment persistence: Is there evidence for stigma effects?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 188-190, March.
  2. Randall Morck, 2009. "Generalized Agency Problems," NBER Working Papers 15051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Maite Blázquez Cuesta & Santiago Budria, 2012. "Unemployment Persistence: How Important Are Non-cognitive Skills?," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 513, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
  4. Yang, Wan-Ru, 2011. "Herding with costly information and signal extraction," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 624-632, October.
  5. Fahr, René & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2011. "Who follows the crowd—Groups or individuals?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 200-209.
  6. Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 2008. "Nonemployment stigma as rational herding: A field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 30-40, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200186. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.