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Behavioral finance in corporate governance: economics and ethics of the devil’s advocate

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Author Info
Randall Morck ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10997-008-9059-4
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Management & Governance.

Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 179-200
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:12:y:2008:i:2:p:179-200

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102940

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Related research
Keywords: Behavioral finance; Corporate governance; Agency problems; Information cascades; Herding; Opposition;

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  1. Renée B. Adams & Heitor Almeida & Daniel Ferreira, 2005. "Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(4), pages 1403-1432. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, 2001. "On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1307, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Baker, Malcolm & Coval, Joshua & Stein, Jeremy C., 2007. "Corporate financing decisions when investors take the path of least resistance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 266-298, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, 1999. "CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(5), pages 1829-1853, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, 2007. "Investor Sentiment in the Stock Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 129-152, Spring.
    Other versions:
  6. Anderson, Lisa R & Holt, Charles A, 1997. "Information Cascades in the Laboratory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 847-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  9. Jonathan E. Alevy & Michael S. Haigh & John A. List, 2007. "Information Cascades: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Financial Market Professionals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 151-180, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & Brian Mittendorf, 2006. "Hierarchical reporting, aggregation, and information cascades," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 355-362. [Downloadable!]
  11. Mathias Drehmann & Joerg Oechssler & Andreas Roider, 2002. "Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets - An Internet Experiment," Experimental 0210001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 842-52, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Markus Noth & Martin Weber, 2003. "Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 166-189, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Marosi, Andr?s & Massoud, Nadia, 2007. "Why Do Firms Go Dark?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(02), pages 421-442, June. [Downloadable!]
  16. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 2003. "Stock market driven acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 295-311, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. De Vany, Arthur & Lee, Cassey, 2001. "Quality signals in information cascades and the dynamics of the distribution of motion picture box office revenues," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 593-614, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. De Vany, Arthur & Walls, W David, 1996. "Bose-Einstein Dynamics and Adaptive Contracting in the Motion Picture Industry," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(439), pages 1493-1514, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Leuz, Christian & Triantis, Alexander & Yue Wang, Tracy, 2008. "Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 181-208, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 7-26. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Dorothea K¸bler & Georg Weizs”cker, 2004. "Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 425-441, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Legal Origins," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1193-1229, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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