IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/sfb373/199939.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics: The indirect evolutionary approach

Author

Listed:
  • Königstein, Manfred
  • Müller, Wieland

Abstract

In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach as initiated by Güth and Yaari (1992). It allows to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate symmetric as well as asymmetric situations. We show how to apply solution concepts that are well known from game theory and evolutionary game theory to solve these games. For illustration we include two examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Königstein, Manfred & Müller, Wieland, 1999. "Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics: The indirect evolutionary approach," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,39, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199939
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/61753/1/722272901.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2009. "Altruism and welfare when preferences are endogenous," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Müller, W. & Normann, H.T., 2003. "Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability : A New Rationale for Consistency," Discussion Paper 2003-44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Ioannis Kordonis & Alexandros C. Charalampidis & George P. Papavassilopoulos, 2018. "Pretending in Dynamic Games, Alternative Outcomes and Application to Electricity Markets," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 844-873, December.
    4. Poulsen, Anders & Poulsen, Odile, 2010. "Prisoner's Dilemma payoffs and the evolution of co-operative preferences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 158-162, April.
    5. Kopel, Michael & Lamantia, Fabio & Szidarovszky, Ferenc, 2014. "Evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 394-409.
    6. Tarik Tazdaït & Alejandro Caparros & Jean-Chrsitophe Péreau, 2008. "Mutual Aid: An Indirect Evolution Analysis," Working Papers halshs-00275386, HAL.
    7. Poulsen, A., 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Papers 01-3, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
    8. Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 2005. "Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A Rationale for Consistency," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 491-502, September.
    9. Schmitt, Rebecca, 2015. "Incorporating Phenotype Plasticity into the Indirect Evolutionary Approach," MPRA Paper 65734, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Konigstein, Manfred & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "Why firms should care for customers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 47-52, July.
    11. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Péreau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2010. "Mutual Aid," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(1), pages 103-128, February.
    12. Gian Italo Bischi & Fabio Lamantia, 2022. "Evolutionary oligopoly games with cooperative and aggressive behaviors," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 17(1), pages 3-27, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199939. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfhubde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.