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A decentralization theorem of taxation

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  • Lipatov, Vilen
  • Weichenrieder, Alfons J.

Abstract

In the EU there are longstanding and ongoing pressures towards a tax that is levied on the EU level to substitute for national contributions. We discuss conditions under which such a transition can make sense, starting from what we call a "decentralization theorem of taxation" that is analogous to Oates (1972) famous result that in the absence of spill-over effects and economies of scale decentralized public good provision weakly dominates central provision. We then drop assumptions that turn out to be unnecessary for this results. While spill-over effects of taxation may call for central rules for taxation, as long as spill-over effects do not depend on the intra-regional distribution of the tax burden, decentralized taxation plus tax coordination is found superior to a union-wide tax.

Suggested Citation

  • Lipatov, Vilen & Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 2015. "A decentralization theorem of taxation," SAFE Working Paper Series 105, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewp:105
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2607967
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(2), pages 313-337.
    2. Roger H. Gordon, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 567-586.
    3. Inman, Robert P. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1996. "Designing tax policy in federalist economies: An overview," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 307-334, June.
    4. Tresch, Richard W., 2014. "Public Finance," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 3, number 9780124158344.
    5. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2000. "Tax structure in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 493-506, March.
    6. Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 1998. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Vietnam," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper9802, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shafik Hebous & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2016. "Toward a Mutualization of European Unemployment Insurance? On Limiting the Downsides of a Fiscal Transfer System for the Eurozone," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 62(2), pages 376-395.
    2. Eren Gürer, 2021. "Equity-efficiency implications of a European tax and transfer system," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 301-346, August.
    3. Hebous, Shafik & Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 2015. "Towards a fiscal union? On the acceptability of a fiscal transfer system in the eurozone," SAFE White Paper Series 28, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal federalism; taxing rights; decentralization theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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