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Private-public partnerships for expanding broadband access: Lessons from the Cinturão Digital do Ceará Network in Brazil

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Listed:
  • Carvalho, Fernando
  • Feferman, Flavio
  • Knight, Peter
  • Woroch, Glenn

Abstract

The Cinturão Digital do Ceará (CDC) is a pioneering infrastructure project that delivers broadband access to large cities, small towns and rural areas throughout the State of Ceará in northeast Brazil. The CDC was built and operated using a unique business model that innovates on the standard public-private partnership (PPP) - an increasingly popular means to undertake Information Communications Technology (ICT) deployments. We review the technical, legal and organizational features of the CDC project with a focus on how they were designed to cope with the unique economic and political conditions of the region. It is particularly instructive how the CDC business model evolved over time in response to political challenges and market failures. We highlight how the model can be adapted to other regions within Brazil, as well as to other developing countries, that seek to pursue dual goals of financial sustainability expansion of broadband access to underserved populations.

Suggested Citation

  • Carvalho, Fernando & Feferman, Flavio & Knight, Peter & Woroch, Glenn, 2014. "Private-public partnerships for expanding broadband access: Lessons from the Cinturão Digital do Ceará Network in Brazil," 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106882, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:itsb14:106882
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Delmon,Jeffrey John, 2010. "Understanding options for public-private partnerships in infrastructure : sorting out the forest from the trees : BOT, DBFO, DCMF, concession, lease . . ," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5173, The World Bank.
    3. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
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