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Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren


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  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
  • Kirstein, Roland


Die Theorie des Wettbewerbs als Entdeckungsverfahren behauptet, daß die Ergebnisse des Wettbewerbes nicht vorhergesagt werden können, weil hierzu Tatsachen benötigt würden, die durch ihn erst entdeckt werden sollen. Dann wäre es allerdings unmöglich, Aussagen über Wettbewerb empirisch zu testen. Unser Beitrag wendet sich gegen diese Ansicht. Wettbewerbsergebnisse können durchaus vorhergesagt werden, soweit die Vorhersage sich auf Muster und nicht auf Einzelergebnisse bezieht. Der Beitrag beschreibt eine ?double-oral auction?, durchgeführt als Hörsaal-Experiment, und zeigt auf, daß Wettbewerb mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit sowohl das Marktgleichgewicht als auch die wohlfahrtsmaximierende Zahl von Transaktionen entdeckt. -- The theory of competition as a discovery procedure argues that the results of this procedure cannot be predicted because of its very nature as a discovery procedure. If this were true, this would imply the impossibilty of testing whether competition actually works as predicted. This article rejects this view. We argue that outcomes of the discovery procedure can be predicted if a pattern rather than its specific realization is the subject of the prediction. We describe a double oral auction as a classroom experiment. and show that competition is likely to discover the market equilibrium as well as the wealth maximizing number of transactions.

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Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2001-02.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200102

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Keywords: market institution; information structure; efficiency;

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Cited by:
  1. Dieter Schmidtchen, . "Wettbewerbsfreiheit, Per se Verbote und die Rule of Reason – Anmerkungen zum institutionenökonomisch-evolutionären Wettbewerbsleitbild
    Freedom to compete, per se rules and the rule of reason
    ," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1159, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  2. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2006. "Wettbewerbsfreiheit, Per se Verbote und die Rule of Reason: Anmerkungen zum institutionenökonomisch-evolutionären Wettbewerbsleitbild," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  3. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2004. "Recht, Eigentum und Effizienz: Zu F. A. v. Hayeks Verfassung der Freiheit," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  4. Heblich, Stephan, 2007. "Eigenverantwortliche Individuen und Pro-Aktive Unternehmen," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-48-07, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.


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