IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zar/wpaper/dt2005-08.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Product differentiation in a mixed duopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Agust�n Gil

    (Department of Economic Analysis. Facultad de Ciencias Econ�micas y Empresariales. Universidad de Zaragoza.)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a mixed duopoly with horizontal product differentiation using the unconstrained Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs. Firms play a noncooperative two-stage game on locations (first stage) and prices (second stage), and we consider that the firms move simultaneously or sequentially in both stages. We examine how the presence of a public firm affects both locations (the nature and degree of differentiation) and prices at equilibrium, and we compare these with the results of the private duopoly, in order to determine the effects of privatization. We find that, save in cases where the private firm is leader on prices where there are multiple equilibria, in the remainder of the cases there are two symmetrical equilibria (depending on whether one firm is located to the left or right of the other); the degree of differentiation of the product and the prices are lower; and the social welfare is higher than in the private duopoly. Privatization of the public firm is therefore not socially desirable

Suggested Citation

  • Agust�n Gil, 2005. "Product differentiation in a mixed duopoly," Documentos de Trabajo dt2005-08, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.
    • Handle: RePEc:zar:wpaper:dt2005-08
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://fecem.unizar.es/sites/fecem/files/archivos/repec/pdf/DT2005-08.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Manuel Salvador & Pilar Gargallo, 2003. "Automatic monitoring and intervention in linear gaussian state-space models: A bayesian approach," Documentos de Trabajo dt2003-05, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.
    2. Jes�s Mur & Ana Angulo, 2005. "Model selection strategies in a spatial context," Documentos de Trabajo dt2005-06, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.
    3. Lola Esteban & Jos� Mar�a Hern�ndez, 2004. "Targeted advertising with vertically differentiated products," Documentos de Trabajo dt2004-07, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.
    4. María Ayuda & Fernando Collantes & Vicente Pinilla, 2010. "From locational fundamentals to increasing returns: the spatial concentration of population in Spain, 1787–2000," Journal of Geographical Systems, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 25-50, March.
    5. d'Aspremont, C & Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold & Thisse, J-F, 1979. "On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1145-1150, September.
    6. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. "Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
    7. Lourdes Torres & Vicente Pina & Sonia Royo, 2005. "E-government and the transformation of public administrations in EU countries: Beyond NPM or just a second wave of reforms?," Documentos de Trabajo dt2005-01, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.
    8. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-311, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Patricia Bachiller & Mar�a Jos� Arcas, 2006. "Performance and capital structure of privatized firms in the european union," Documentos de Trabajo dt2006-02, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Patricia Bachiller & Mar�a Jos� Arcas, 2006. "Performance and capital structure of privatized firms in the european union," Documentos de Trabajo dt2006-02, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.
    2. Herr Annika, 2011. "Quality and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly with Regulated Prices: The Case of a Public and a Private Hospital," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(4), pages 422-437, December.
    3. Herr, Annika, 2009. "Product differentiation and welfare in a mixed duopoly with regulated prices: the case of a public and a private hospital," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 08/2009, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    4. Marco Marini & Alberto Zevi, 2011. "‘Just one of us’: consumers playing oligopoly in mixed markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(3), pages 239-263, November.
    5. Yang, Ya-Po & Wu, Shih-Jye & Hu, Jin-Li, 2014. "Market Structure, Production Efficiency, And Privatization," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 55(1), pages 89-108, June.
    6. Luca Lambertini & Arsen Palestini & Alessandro Tampieri, 2016. "CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externality," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(1), pages 236-252, July.
    7. Rabah Amir & Giuseppe Feo, 2014. "Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 629-658, August.
    8. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
    9. Kangsik Choi, 2006. "Mixed Motives of Simultaneous-move Games in a Mixed Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(14), pages 1-7.
    10. Ishida, Junichiro & Matsushima, Noriaki, 2009. "Should civil servants be restricted in wage bargaining? A mixed-duopoly approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 634-646, April.
    11. Amparo M. Mármol & Luisa Monroy & M. Ángeles Caraballo & Asunción Zapata, 2017. "Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 365-383, October.
    12. Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos, 2012. "Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 1019-1023.
    13. Duc De Ngo & Mahito Okura, 2008. "Coopetition in a Mixed Duopoly Market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(21), pages 1-9.
    14. Mumcu, Ayşe & Oğur, Serhan & Zenginobuz, Unal, 2001. "Competition between regulated and non-regulated generators on electric power networks," MPRA Paper 376, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Armel Jacques, 2022. "Strategic debt in a mixed duopoly: The limited liability effect," TEPP Working Paper 2022-14, TEPP.
    16. Kazuharu Kiyono & Jota Ishikawa, 2013. "Reexamination of Strategic Public Policies," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 64(2), pages 201-231, June.
    17. Jiancai Pi & Li Yang & Yu Zhou, 2013. "Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly," Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci/Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics and Business, vol. 31(2), pages 163-192.
    18. Liu, Yi & Lahiri, Sajal & Liu, Tianqi, 2018. "Optimal Partial Privatization in the Presence of Foreign Competition: The Role of Efficiency Differentials and Unemployment," MPRA Paper 91471, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jan 2019.
    19. Toshihiro Matsumura & Yoshihiro Tomaru, 2015. "Mixed duopoly, location choice, and shadow cost of public funds," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(2), pages 416-429, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mixed duopoly; spatial competition; privatization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zar:wpaper:dt2005-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Isabel Acero Fraile (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fezares.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.