IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ysm/wpaper/amz2607.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Extensive Income and Value of the Firm: Who Gets What?

Author

Listed:
  • Shyam Sunder

Abstract

In the neoclassical model of the firm, value surplus of the firm is assumed to accrue to its owner. Contract model suggests a distribution of the surplus among various agents depending on the imperfections of the markets in which they transact with the firm. If the share of the surplus to an agent declines with the perfection of the market in which he transacts, shareholders should be expected to get only a small piece of the pie, violating the neoclassical assumption. The paper explores an extensive value concept and its measurement for firms. It also examines the implications of extensive value for what we do and do not know about the consequences of corporate mergers and acquisitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Shyam Sunder, 2002. "Extensive Income and Value of the Firm: Who Gets What?," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2607, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jun 2009.
    • Handle: RePEc:ysm:wpaper:amz2607
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.som.yale.edu/icfpub/publications/2607.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, 2004. "The Social Discount Rate," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(6), pages 1257-1268, December.
    2. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 33-68, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
    4. Scherer, F M, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 69-82, Winter.
    5. Asquith, Paul, 1983. "Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 51-83, April.
    6. Jarrell, Gregg A & Brickley, James A & Netter, Jeffry M, 1988. "The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 49-68, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Takeover Waves : Triggers, Performance and Motives," Discussion Paper 2005-029, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    2. Martynova, M., 2006. "The market for corporate control and corporate governance regulation in Europe," Other publications TiSEM 8651e281-4914-41f2-ac14-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Rikard Larsson & Sydney Finkelstein, 1999. "Integrating Strategic, Organizational, and Human Resource Perspectives on Mergers and Acquisitions: A Case Survey of Synergy Realization," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, February.
    4. Shyam Sunder, 2002. "Extensive Income and Value of the Firm: Who Gets What?," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2607, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jun 2009.
    5. Marco Bigelli & Stefano Mengoli, 2004. "Sub-Optimal Acquisition Decisions under a Majority Shareholder System," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 8(4), pages 373-405, October.
    6. Dickerson, Andrew P. & Gibson, Heather D. & Tsakalotos, Euclid, 2002. "Takeover risk and the market for corporate control: the experience of British firms in the 1970s and 1980s," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1167-1195, October.
    7. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
    8. Fligstein, Neil & Shin, Taek-Jin, 2005. "Shareholder Value and Changes in American Industries, 1984-2000," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt82j7915n, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    9. Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "On the economics and politics of corporate finance and corporate control," Papers 98-43, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    10. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1990. "Takeovers and stock price volatility," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 76(Mar), pages 29-44.
    11. Imdat Dogan, "undated". "Testing The Merger Premiums In Publicly Traded Firms: The Case Of U.S. Commercial Banks," Review of Socio - Economic Perspectives 201831, Reviewsep.
    12. Malmendier, Ulrike & Opp, Marcus M. & Saidi, Farzad, 2016. "Target revaluation after failed takeover attempts: Cash versus stock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 92-106.
    13. Richards, Timothy J. & Manfredo, Mark R., 2003. "Cooperative Mergers and Acquisitions: The Role of Capital Constraints," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-17, April.
    14. Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and where do we stand?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 2148-2177, October.
    15. Andrey Golubov & Dimitris Petmezas & Nickolaos G. Travlos, 2013. "Empirical mergers and acquisitions research: a review of methods, evidence and managerial implications," Chapters, in: Adrian R. Bell & Chris Brooks & Marcel Prokopczuk (ed.), Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Empirical Finance, chapter 12, pages 287-313, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Yeh Tsung-Ming & Yasuo Hoshino, 2002. "THE IMPACT OF M&As ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWANESE CORPORATIONS," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 40(4), pages 553-563, December.
    17. Chemla, Gilles, 2005. "Hold-up, stakeholders and takeover threats," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 376-397, July.
    18. Michael C. Jensen, 1987. "The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 31, pages 102-148.
    19. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4134 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Rudolf Kerschbamer, 1998. "Disciplinary Takeovers and Industry Effects," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 265-306, June.
    21. Fligstein, Neil & Shin, Taek-Jin, 2007. "Shareholder Value and the Transformation of American Industries, 1984-2001," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt4r16k6j6, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ysm:wpaper:amz2607. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/smyalus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.