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Fiscal Externalities with Imperfect Population Mobility The Three Region Case

Author

Listed:
  • Arman Mansoorian

    (York University, Canada)

  • Gordon Myers

    (University of Waterloo, Canada)

Abstract

We consider a federation with three regions and an imperfectly mobile population. If in the Nash equilibrium one region makes transfers to the other two then the outcome is efficient. If in the Nash equilibrium two regions make transfers to a third region the outcome may be inefficient, because each of the transfer making regions ignores the effect of its transfers on migration out of the other rich region, and the resulting benefit to that region. Nevertheless, the Nash equilibrium is efficient when the two transfer making regions are strongly tied together by migration.

Suggested Citation

  • Arman Mansoorian & Gordon Myers, 1996. "Fiscal Externalities with Imperfect Population Mobility The Three Region Case," Working Papers 1996_05, York University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:yca:wpaper:1996_05
    as

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    File URL: ftp://dept.econ.yorku.ca/pub/working_papers/96-05.pdf
    File Function: First version, 1996
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mieszkowski, Peter & Zodrow, George R, 1989. "Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1098-1146, September.
    2. Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1993. "Attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 117-132, August.
    3. Hercowitz, Zvi & Pines, David, 1991. "Migration with fiscal externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 163-180, November.
    4. Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1997. "On the consequences of government objectives for economies with mobile populations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 265-281, January.
    5. Flatters, Frank & Henderson, Vernon & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1974. "Public goods, efficiency, and regional fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 99-112, May.
    6. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1977. "The Theory of Local Public Goods," International Economic Association Series, in: Martin S. Feldstein & Robert P. Inman (ed.), The Economics of Public Services, chapter 12, pages 274-333, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Myers, Gordon M., 1990. "Optimality, free mobility, and the regional authority in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 107-121, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federation; Migration; Interregional Transfers; Efficiency.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis

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