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Coordination, Cooperation, And The Extended Coasean Approach To Economic Policy

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Author Info
Alberto Chilosi (University of Pisa)

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Abstract

The Coasean way to deal with the cooperation failure that is implicit in Pareto inefficiency is to remove or lessen the obstacles to cooperation through the attribution of property rights and the elimination or reduction of transaction costs. The relevance of this approach is however undermined by some intrinsic difficulties to its application in a real world context, such as those arising from the number and indeterminacy of the interested parties, as well as from the free rider problem. A way to extend the Coasean approach taking into account those real life limitations is to consider the local authorities as representatives of the interest of their local constituencies and, through the provision of an adequate institutional framework, to enhance the opportunities for cooperation through voluntary agreements involving private and public parties. Thus the extent of cooperation could be widened, as opposite to traditional remedial actions relying on non- contractual, or direct entrepreneurial action by the state. With the reduction in the appeal of direct and coercive action by the state a number of institutions emphasising the contractual cooperation between public and private parties have effectively grown of importance, as wide apart as the township and village enterprises in China, or the “programmazione negoziata” in Italy. In the final part of the paper the latter

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0306003.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jun 2003
Date of revision: 09 Sep 2003
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0306003

Note: Type of Document - Acrobat pdf; prepared on windows xp; to print on A4; pages: 26; figures: none
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: coase theorem; economic policy; transition; property rights; cooperation; coordination;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K0 - Law and Economics - - General
H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2003. "Altruistic Punishment in Humans," Microeconomics 0305006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kiminiori Matsuyama, 1995. "Economic Development as Coordination Problems," Discussion Papers 1123, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, 2001. "Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 479-535, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Usher, Dan, 1998. "The Coase theorem is tautological, incoherent or wrong," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 3-11, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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