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A General Equilibrium Model of the Three-Sector Competitive Economy

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  • S.Y. Wu

    (Economics)

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    Abstract

    The presence of externality, indivisibility, and uncertainty destroys the market's ability to coordinate production. Entrepreneurs rise to organize production by assuming a part of the allocative role traditionally reserved exclusively to the market. Assume that there are three classes of entrepreneurs: profit- oriented, nonprofit oriented and public entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs cooperate with their own type to organize, respectively, the for-profit and nonprofit firms, as well as local communities. They do so by playing a society-wide cooperative game. At the conclusion of this game, not only firms and communities come into existence, production and exchange also take place at competitive equilibrium prices. This equilibrium is pareto optimal.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 9603002.

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    Length: 42 pages
    Date of creation: 05 Mar 1996
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9603002

    Note: Zipped using PKZIP v2.04, encoded using UUENCODE v5.15. Zipped file includes 1 file -- handbook (body in WP5.1, 42 pages)
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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
    2. David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, 1983. "The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 531-538, Autumn.
    3. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
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