Spatially differentiated duopolists set higher-than-monopoly prices at some distances. This phenomenon is shown to occur in any finite- dimensional space for a class of reservation prices that covers concavity and convexity in perceived distance from a design. But an upper bound on the equilibrium duopoly price converges monotonically and quickly to the monopoly price in dimensionality. If consumers care about sufficiently many features of the product (a very small number of criteria is enough), monopoly nearly leads to an extreme price.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number
0509007.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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