New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to evaluate two new anti-merger instruments, innovation markets and unilateral effects, on the basis of economic theory and evidence. I first discuss how the economics of antitrust has developed over the years, with the intention of characterizing the intellectual inheritance of 1990s’ antitrust regulators. Within this context, I then discuss each anti-merger instrument, how it has been applied in specific cases, and how it accords with underlying economic science. On the basis of these arguments, antitrust regulators should pause and reconsider the theoretical and empirical bases of applying unilateral effects and innovation markets to merger investigations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0512003.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 12 Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20. This paper was published in Cato Journal, Winter 2001. Stable URL:
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antitrust; mergers; innovation markets; unilateral effects;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K - Law and Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-12-20 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HPE-2005-12-20 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-IND-2005-12-20 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2005-12-20 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2005-12-20 (Regulation)
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