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A Strategic Market Game with Active Bankruptcy

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Author Info
J. Geanakoplos
I. Karatzas
M. Shubik
W. Sudderth

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Abstract

We construct stationary Markov equilibria for an economy with fiat money, one nondurable commodity, countably-many time periods, and a continuum of agents. The total production of commodity remains constant, but individual agents' endowments fluctuate in a random fashion from period to period. In order to hedge against these random fluctuations, agents find it useful to hold fiat money which they can borrow or deposit at appropriate rates of interest; such activity may take place either at a central bank (which fixes interest rates judiciously) or through a money-market (in which interest rates are determined endogenously).

We carry out an equilibrium analysis, based on a careful study of Dynamic Programming equations and on properties of the invariant measures for associated optimally-controlled Markov chains. This analysis yields the stationary distribution of wealth across agents, as well as the stationary price (for the commodity) and interest rates (for the borrowing and lending of fiat money).

A distinctive feature of our analysis is the incorporation of bankruptcy, both as a real possibility in an individual agent's optimization problem, and as a determinant of interest rates through appropriate balance equations. These allow a central bank (respectively, a money-market) to announce (respectively, to determine endogenously) interest rates in a way that conserves the total money-supply and controls in ation.

General results are provided for the existence of such stationary equilibria, and several explicitly solvable examples are treated in detail.

Submitted to Journal of Mathematical Economics.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Santa Fe Institute in its series Working Papers with number 99-04-025.

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Date of creation: Apr 1999
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Handle: RePEc:wop:safiwp:99-04-025

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Related research
Keywords: Stochastic games; bankruptcy; strategic market games; parallel dynamic programs; theory of money;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
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  1. John H. Miller & Martin Shubik, 1992. "Some Dynamics of a Strategic Market Game with a Large Number of Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1037, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 1997. "A Stochastic Infinite-Horizon Economy with Secured Lending, or Unsecured Lending and Bankruptcy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1156, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 2008. "Financial Control of a Competitive Economy without Randomness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1681, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Geanakoplos & Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 2009. "Inflationary Equilibrium in a Stochastic Economy with Independent Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1708, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 2000. "A Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy with Inheritance," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1262, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 2000. "Information and the Existence of Stationary Markovian Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1261, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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