Some dynamics of a strategic market game with a large number of agents
AbstractThis paper is designed to combine the game theoretic investigation of the static or equilibrium properties of large strategic market games together with the investigation of some very simple dynamics, which nevertheless are sufficient to show differences between two related games, one in which both borrowing and trade take place. The role of banking reserves emerges as relevant and sensitive to the transient state dynamics. Several 100,000 player games are simulated and the behavior is constructed with the analytical prediction for the games with a continuum of agents.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie.
Volume (Year): 60 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
Other versions of this item:
- John H. Miller & Martin Shubik, 1992. "Some Dynamics of a Strategic Market Game with a Large Number of Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1037, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Feldman, Mark & Gilles, Christian, 1985. "An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 26-32, February.
- Holland, John H & Miller, John H, 1991. "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 365-71, May.
- Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 1992. "Construction of Stationary Markov Equilibria in a Strategic Market Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1033, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-68, October.
- Martin Shubik & Ward Whitt, 1973. "Fiat Money in an Economy with One Nondurable Good and No Credit (A Noncooperative Sequential Game)," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 355, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Geanakoplos, J. & Karatzas, I. & Shubik, M. & Sudderth, W., 2000.
"A strategic market game with active bankruptcy,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 359-396, November.
- John Geanakoplos & Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 1998. "A Strategic Market Game with Active Bankruptcy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1183, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- J. Geanakoplos & I. Karatzas & M. Shubik & W. Sudderth, 1999. "A Strategic Market Game with Active Bankruptcy," Working Papers 99-04-025, Santa Fe Institute.
- Ioannis Karatzas & Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth, 1995.
"A Strategic Market Game with Secured Lending,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1099, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Martin Shubik & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 1999. "A Behavioral Approach to a Strategic Market Game," Research in Economics 99-01-003e, Santa Fe Institute.
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