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Collective Choice and Mutual Knowledge Structures

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Author Info
Diana Richards
Whitman A. Richards
Brendan D. McKay
Abstract

An important puzzle in the study of complex systems is the conditions under which the aggregation of information from interacting agents results in a stable or an unstable collective outcome. We present a general framework for thinking about the stability and instability of collective outcomes that focuses on the effects of mutual knowledge. We show that if a complex system of aggregated choice respects a mutual knowledge structure, then the prospects of a stable collective outcome are considerably improved. Our domain-independent results apply to collective choice ranging from perception, where an interpretation of sense data is made by a collection of perceptual modules, to social choice, where a group decision is made from a set of preferences held by individuals.

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Paper provided by Santa Fe Institute in its series Research in Economics with number 98-04-032e.

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Date of creation: Apr 1998
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Handle: RePEc:wop:safire:98-04-032e

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Keywords: Complex system; stability; collective choice; knowledge structures; cognition;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Schofield, Norman, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Saari, Donald G., 1991. "Erratic behavior in economic models," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 3-35, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. John R. Freeman & Jude C. Hays & Helmut Stix, 1999. "Democracy and Markets: The Case of Exchange Rates," Working Papers 39, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank). [Downloadable!]
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