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Vote-maximizing versus utility-maximizing candidates: Comparing dynamic models of Bi-Party competition

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  • François Petry

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  • François Petry, 1982. "Vote-maximizing versus utility-maximizing candidates: Comparing dynamic models of Bi-Party competition," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 507-526, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:16:y:1982:i:6:p:507-526
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00156302
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wittman, Donald A., 1973. "Parties as Utility Maximizers," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 490-498, June.
    2. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    3. Norman Schofield, 1980. "Formal political theory," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 249-275, January.
    4. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
    5. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C. & Winer, Mark D., 1978. "The Competitive Solution for N-Person Games Without Transferable Utility, With an Application to Committee Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 599-615, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary Cox, 1984. "An expected-utility model of electoral competition," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 337-349, August.
    2. Gary Cox, 1984. "Electoral equilibrium in double member districts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 443-451, January.

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