Vote-maximizing versus utility-maximizing candidates: Comparing dynamic models of Bi-Party competition
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Quality and Quantity.
Volume (Year): 16 (1982)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/11135
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Norman Schofield, 1980. "Formal political theory," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 249-275, January.
- Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
- Gary Cox, 1984. "Electoral equilibrium in double member districts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 443-451, January.
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