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Optimal Contracts for Vertically Connected, Unionized Duopolies

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Author Info
Thomas Grandner () (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics & B.A.)
Abstract

In this paper a vertically structured duopolistic market with unionized price setting firms is analyzed. The form of the contract of the transactions between upstream and downstream firms can be linear pricing, franchising or vertical integration. It is known from literature (Irmen (1997)) that the price elasticity of the industry demand and the degree of product differentiation are the decisive factors in the determination of the profit maximizing form of the contract. In this paper it is shown that the bargaining power of the union is an additional factor. With a higher bargaining power linear pricing becomes less preferable.

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Paper provided by Vienna University of Economics and B.A., Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number wuwp071.

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Date of creation: Jul 2000
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Handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp071

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Related research
Keywords: Vertical Integration Trade Unions

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Corneo, Giacomo, 1995. "National wage bargaining in an internationally integrated product market," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 503-520, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Dobson, Paul W., 1994. "Multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Wage bargaining with incomplete information in an unionized Cournot oligopoly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 353-374, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Dowrick, Steve, 1989. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 1123-42, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Irmen, Andreas, 1997. "Note on duopolistic vertical restraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1559-1567, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Santoni, Michele, 1996. "Union-Oligopoly Sequential Bargaining: Trade and Industrial Policies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 640-63, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vlassis, Minas, 2000. "Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union-oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 261-281, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 257-65, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1993. "Staggered vs. synchronised wage setting in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1507-1522, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Lin, Y Joseph, 1988. "Oligopoly and Vertical Integration: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 251-54, March.
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