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The effects of volumetric pricing policy on farmers? water management institutions and their water use: the case of water user organization in an irrigation system in Hubei, China

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  • Kajisa,Kei
  • Dong,Bin

Abstract

This article examines the effect of water pricing policies on farmers? water saving behaviors, using original water user group (WUG) data from a reservoir irrigation system in China. The introduction of volumetric water pricing at the group level, to replace area-based pricing, induces institutional change to prevent each member?s overuse of water when the volumetric price levels are moderate. Depending on the initial conditions, the multiple pathways of change lead to new institutional arrangements, with all of them contributing to water savings. However, when the price is set high enough, many farmers exit a WUG for private irrigation. This tendency is associated with an increased probability that the remaining members do not undertake institutional change and that they do not end up saving water. This may be due to the increased management difficulties among the remaining members whose fields are separated by former members who have now opted out for private irrigation across the WUG. As a result, we do not find evidence that the reservoir water is saved at high volumetric price levels.

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  • Kajisa,Kei & Dong,Bin, 2015. "The effects of volumetric pricing policy on farmers? water management institutions and their water use: the case of water user organization in an irrigation system in Hubei, China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7369, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7369
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    1. Dharmapala, Dhammika & Slemrod, Joel & Wilson, John Douglas, 2011. "Tax policy and the missing middle: Optimal tax remittance with firm-level administrative costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(9-10), pages 1036-1047, October.
    2. Williamson, Oliver, 2009. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 111-134, December.
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    1. Rosegrant, Mark W. & Fan, Shenggen & Otsuka, Keijiro, 2021. "Global issues in agricultural development," IFPRI book chapters, in: Agricultural development: New perspectives in a changing world, chapter 2, pages 35-78, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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