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Corruption and the composition of foreign direct investment - firm-level evidence

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Author Info
Smarzynska, Beata K.
Shang-Jin Wei

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Abstract

The authors study the impact of corruption in a host country on foreign investors'preference for a joint venture, or a wholly owned subsidiary. Their simple model highlights a basic tradeoff in using local partners. On the one hand, corruption makes the local bureaucracy less transparent, and increases the value of using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic maze. On the other hand, corruption decreases the effective protection of an investors'intangible assets, and reduces the probability that disputes between foreign and domestic partners, will be adjudicated fairly, which reduces the value of having a local partner. As the investor's technological sophistication increases, so does the importance of protecting intangible assets, which tilts the preference away from joint ventures in a corrupt country. Empirical tests of this hypothesis on firm-level data show that corruption reduces inward foreign direct investment, and shifts the ownership structure toward joint ventures. Conditional on foreign direct investment taking place, an increase in corruption from the level found in Hungary to that found in Azerbaijan, decreases the probability of a wholly owned subsidiary by 10 to 20 percent. Technologically more advanced firms are less likely to engage in joint ventures, however. The authors find support for the view that U.S. firms are more averse to joint ventures in corrupt countries than other foreign investors - possibly because the U.S. Foreign corrupt Practices Act, which stipulates penalties for executives of U.S. companies whose employees, or local partners engage in paying bribes. But although U.S. companies are more likely than investors from other countries to retain full ownership of firms in corrupt countries, they are not less likely than firms from other countries to undertake foreign direct investment in thosecountries.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2360.

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Date of creation: 30 Jun 2000
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2360

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Related research
Keywords: International Terrorism&Counterterrorism; Fiscal&Monetary Policy; Decentralization; Economic Theory&Research; Legal Products; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism; Governance Indicators; National Governance; Foreign Direct Investment; Legal Products;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?," NBER Working Papers 7093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Bruce Kogut & Harbir Singh, 1988. "The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 411-432, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "Why is Corruption So Much More Taxing Than Tax? Arbitrariness Kills," NBER Working Papers 6255, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Aggregating governance indicators," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2195, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Wheeler, David & Mody, Ashoka, 1992. "International investment location decisions : The case of U.S. firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 57-76, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Magnus Blomstrom & Mario Zejan, 1991. "Why Do Multinational Firms Seek Out Joint Ventures?," NBER Working Papers 2987, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Elizabeth Asiedu & Hadi Salehi Esfahani, 2001. "Ownership Structure In Foreign Direct Investment Projects," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 647-662, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Frances Ruane & Xiaoheng Zhang, 2007. "Where do MNEs Expand Production: Location Choices of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe after 1992," Papers WP211, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). [Downloadable!]
  2. Utz Weitzel & Sjors Berns, 2006. "Cross-Border Takeovers, Corruption, and Related Aspects of Governance," Working Papers 06-03, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Joel S. Hellman & Geraint Jones & Daniel Kaufmann, 2003. "Far From Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?," Development and Comp Systems 0308006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nikopour , Hesam & Shah Habibullah, Muzafar & Schneider, Friedrich & Law, Siong Hook, 2009. "Foreign Direct Investment and Shadow Economy: A Causality Analysis Using Panel Data," MPRA Paper 14485, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dahlström, Tobias & Johnson, Andreas, 2007. "Bureaucratic Corruption, MNEs and FDI," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 82, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hallward-Driemeier, Mary & Wallsten, Scott & Lixin Colin Xu, 2003. "The investment climate and the firm : firm-level evidence from China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3003, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Philipp Harms & Heinrich Ursprung, 2001. "Do Civil and Political Repression Really Boost Foreign Direct Investments?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Smarzynska Javorcik, Beata & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2001. "Pollution Havens and Foreign Direct Investment: Dirty Secret or Popular Myth?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2966, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Jaime Ortiz Arizabalo, 2007. "Corrupcion Y Concentracion Del Ingreso: Su Impacto En Las Empresas Latinoamericanas," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 10(2), pages 127-150. [Downloadable!]
  10. Nelson Ramírez-Rondán & Saki Bigio, 2006. "Corruption and Development Indicators: An Empirical Review," Working Papers 2006-007, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. [Downloadable!]
  11. Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin & Prado, Jr., Jose Mauricio, 2007. "Determinants of Capital Intensive and R&D Intensive Foreign Direct Investment," Seminar Papers 753, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
  12. Christian Hopp & Axel Dreher, 2007. "Do Differences in Institutional and Legal Environments Explain Cross-Country Variations in IPO Underpricing?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Witold Henisz, 2004. "The Political Economy of Trans-Pacific Business Linkages," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1). [Downloadable!]
  14. Johnson, Andreas, 2006. "FDI inflows to the Transition Economies in Eastern Europe: Magnitude and Determinants," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 59, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies. [Downloadable!]
  15. Céline Azémar & Paolo Gregory Corcos, . "Multinational Firms' Heterogeneity in Tax Responsiveness: the Role of Transfer Pricing," Working Papers 2008_04, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Feb 2008. [Downloadable!]
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