This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Regional integration as diplomacy

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Schiff, Maurice
Winters, L. Alan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Regional integration agreements (RIAs) are examples of second best and have an ambiguous impact on welfare, contend the authors. They build a model in which RIAs unambiguously raise welfare by correcting for externalities. It assumes that trade between neighboring countries increases trust between them and reduces the likelihood of conflict. The optimum intervention in that case is a subsidy on imports from the neighbor. The authors show that an equivalent solution is for the neighboring countries to tax imports fromthe rest of the world -that is, to form an RIA- together with imposing some domestic taxes. In fact, security threats have moved neighboring countries to form RIAs. Examples include the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the European Economic Community (1957) to reduce the threat of war in Europe, as well as various RIAs among developing countries. The authors show, among other things, that: 1) the optimum tariffs on imports from the rest of the world are likely to decline over time; 2) deep integration implies lower optimum external tariffs if it is exogenous; 3) but if deep integration is endogenous, it implies higher optimum external tariffs before it occurs and lower ones thereafter; and 4) enlargement of a bloc (in terms of symmetric countries) has an ambiguous impact on external tariffs but improves welfare, and some form of domino effect exists in the sense that enlargement increases the incentive for nonmembers to seek accession. Although externalities associated with security matters imply that an RIA may maximize welfare, this model suggests that the RIA is a transitory arrangement in the sense that optimum trade preferences are highest at the time the RIA is formed (when security is low) and tend to decline over time. In other words, the RIA's external trade policy becomes increasingly open over time (as well as following deep integration).

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/02/24/000009265_3971023104538/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1801.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 31 Aug 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1801

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

Related research
Keywords: Rules of Origin; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Trade Policy; Trade Policy; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Trade and Regional Integration;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cadot, O. & De Melo, J. & Olarreaga, M., 1996. "Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-Members," University of Geneva Economics Working Papers 96.07, University of Geneva, Department of Political Economy.
    Other versions:
  2. Marco López-Cerdá & Guillermo Owen & Jos Potters & Carles Raffels & E. Calvo & F. Valenciano & J. Zarzuelo, 1993. "Discussion," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 36-51, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Smith, Alasdair, 1992. "Measuring the effects of '1992'," Discussion Papers in Economics 07/92, Department of Economics, University of Sussex.
  4. Hirschman, Albert O, 1982. "Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1463-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Guglielmo Maria Caporale & Christophe Rault & Robert Sova & Ana Maria Sova, 2008. "On the Bilateral Trade Effects of Free Trade Agreements between the EU-15 and the CEEC-4 Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kaminski, Bartlomiej & de la Rocha, Manuel, 2003. "Stabilization and association process in the Banlkans : integration options and their assessment," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3108, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Schiff, Maurice, 2000. "Multilateral trade liberalization and political disintegration - implications for the evolution of free trade areas and customs unions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2350, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. John Robst & Solomon Polachek & Yuan-Ching Chang, 2006. "Geographic Proximity, Trade and International Conflict/Cooperation," IZA Discussion Papers 1988, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Uche, Chibuike U., 2001. "The politics of monetary sector cooperation among the Economic Community of West African States members," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2647, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Honohan, Patrick & Lane, Philip R., 2000. "Will the Euro trigger more monetary unions in Africa?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2393, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Maur, Jean-Christophe, 2008. "Regionalism and trade facilitation : a primer," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4464, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Musleh-Ud Din & Shahbaz Nasir, 2004. "Regional Economic Integration in South Asia: The Way Forward," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 43(4), pages 959-974. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also covers the most complete directory of Economics departments and institutes, EDIRC.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-19.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.