Unemployment insurance and duration of unemployment : evidence from Slovenia's transition
AbstractBetween 1990 and 1992 in Slovenia, recipients of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits tended to remain (formally) unemployed until their benefits expired, before taking a job. Institutional set-up suggests, and labor surveys show, that many of the recipients were actually working while collecting UI benefits. In the spirit, if not in the letter of the law, the UI system was abused. The author shows that the escape rate of the recipients of unemployment compensation to employment increased dramatically just before the potential exhaustion of unemployment benefits - and decreased equally dramatically after benefits were exhausted. When grouped by the potential duration of benefits, unemployment length varies significantly. The unemployed with longer potential benefits stay unemployed longer. Because these groups differ in their characteristics (for example, in age), this does not prove the"waiting behavior"of the recipients. However, exits to employment dramatically increase just before exhaustion - and that does prove waiting behavior. The pattern of an increased escape rate just before benefits are exhausted and its dramatic fall thereafter is more rigorously demonstrated using hazard model estimation. Possibilities for informal employment are abundant in Slovenia, and the environment of transition economies generally seems conducive to misuse of the UI system. Legislative loopholes and failure to enforce the labor code allowed the unemployed to work and to collect benefits. The monitoring of job searches was also lax. The author's calculations suggest that reducing the duration of benefits would reduce the incidence of unemployment, its duration, the amount spent on UI benefits, and the inefficiencies generated by raising taxes to finance unemployment insurance. At the same time, reducing the duration of benefits would not impair job matches or crowd out jobs for nonrecipients. True, despite increased efficiency generally, the workers with the least job mobility might suffer hardships for the least mobile group and greater efficiency generally would have to be resolved in the political sphere. Redesigning the system for better targeting would be less controversial. One way to reduce UI spending without seriously curtailing incentives to work would be to reduce the benefits in proportion to earnings from irregular work. Another possibility is stricter monitoring of the job searches of the unemployed. To reduce spending and make"double dipping"less attractive, old-age insurance could be removed from the package of benefits the UI system offers. Also, counselors who help the unemployed find jobs (and who may thus develop a close relationship with them) should perhaps not be expected to be able to make impartial decisions about disqualifications for benefits; someone else should do that. In addition to better targeting, a"benefit transfer program"- a voluntary program that converts UI benefits Also, counselors who help the unemployed find jobs (through vouchers) into hiring subsidies - seems particularly attractive for Slovenia and other transition economies. In a way, such a program would legalize the"double-dipping"that has been taking place in Slovenia and possibly elsewhere. It would legalize practices that have undermined the system's credibility. But it might improve fiscal savings while sustaining the incentive to find jobs.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1552.
Date of creation: 31 Dec 1995
Date of revision:
Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; Labor Policies; Public Health Promotion; Health Monitoring&Evaluation; Environmental Economics&Policies; Youth and Governance; Health Monitoring&Evaluation; Labor Markets; Social Protections&Assistance;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lawrence Katz & Bruce Meyer, 1988.
"The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment,"
621, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Katz, Lawrence F. & Meyer, Bruce D., 1990. "The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 45-72, February.
- Lawrence F. Katz & Bruce D. Meyer, 1988. "The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 2741, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vodopivec, Milan & Hribar-Milic, Samo, 1993. "The Slovenian labor market in transition : issues and lessons learned," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1162, The World Bank.
- Snower, Dennis J., 1994.
"The Simple Economics of Benefit Transfers,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1086, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Meyer, Bruce D, 1990.
"Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells,"
Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 757-82, July.
- Atkinson, Anthony B & Micklewright, John, 1991. "Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(4), pages 1679-1727, December.
- Orazem, Peter F & Vodopivec, Milan, 1995.
"Winners and Losers in Transition: Returns to Education, Experience, and Gender in Slovenia,"
World Bank Economic Review,
World Bank Group, vol. 9(2), pages 201-30, May.
- Orazem, Peter F. & Vodopivec, Milan, 1994. "Winners and losers in transition : returns to education, experience, and gender in Slovenia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1342, The World Bank.
- Orazem, Peter & Vodopivec, Milan, 1995. "Winners and Losers in Transition: Returns to Education, Experience, and Gender in Slovenia," Staff General Research Papers 5270, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Jennifer Hunt, 1992.
"The Effect of Unemployment Compensation on Unemployment Duration in Germany,"
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin
50, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Hunt, Jennifer, 1995. "The Effect of Unemployment Compensation on Unemployment Duration in Germany," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 88-120, January.
- Haltiwanger, John C. & Vodopivec, Milan, 2002.
"Gross worker and job flows in a transition economy: an analysis of Estonia,"
Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 601-630, November.
- Haltiwanger, John C. & Vodopivec, Milan, 1999. "Gross worker and job flows in a transition economy : an analysis of Estonia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2082, The World Bank.
- Pieter Serneels, 2002.
"Explaining Non-Negative Duration Dependence Among the Unemployed,"
Economics Series Working Papers
WPS/2002-13, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Pieter Serneels, 2004. "Explaining Non-Negative Duration Dependence Among the Unemployed," Development and Comp Systems 0409013, EconWPA.
- Pieter Serneels, 2002. "Explaining Non-Negative Duration Dependence Among the Unemployed," CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-13, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Anne Lauringson, 2011. "Disincentive effects of unemployment insurance benefits: maximum benefit duration versus benefit level," Baltic Journal of Economics, Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies, vol. 11(1), pages 25-50, July.
- David Card & Raj Chetty & Andrea Weber, 2007.
"The Spike at Benefit Exhaustion: Leaving the Unemployment System or Starting a New Job?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 113-118, May.
- David Card & Raj Chetty & Andrea Weber, 2007. "The Spike at Benefit Exhaustion: Leaving the Unemployment System or Starting a New Job?," NBER Working Papers 12893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Card, David & Chetty, Raj & Weber, Andrea, 2007. "The Spike at Benefit Exhaustion: Leaving the Unemployment System or Starting a New Job?," IZA Discussion Papers 2590, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Boone, J. & Ours, J.C. van, 2009.
"Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?,"
2009-84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Jan Boone & Jan Ours, 2012. "Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 160(4), pages 413-438, December.
- Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C., 2009. "Why is there a spike in the job finding rate at benefit exhaustion?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7525, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C., 2009. "Why Is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?," IZA Discussion Papers 4523, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Jan Boone & Jan C. van Ours, 2009. "Why is there a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2840, CESifo Group Munich.
- Natalia Smirnova, 2003.
"Job Search Behavior of Unemployed in Russia,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
2003-629, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Vodopivec, Milan & Raju, Dhushyanth, 2002. "Income support systems for the unemployed : issues and options," Social Protection Discussion Papers 25529, The World Bank.
- Darja Boršič & Alenka Kavkler, 2009. "Modeling Unemployment Duration in Slovenia using Cox Regression Models," Transition Studies Review, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 145-156, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.