Zero-Intelligence Trading without Resampling
AbstractThis paper studies the consequences of removing the resampling assumption from the zero-intelligence trading model in Gode and Sunder (1993). We obtain three results. First, individual rationality is no longer sufficient to attain allocative effciency in a continuous double auction; hence, the rules of the market matter. Second, the allocative effciency of the continuous double auction is higher than for other sequential protocols both with or without resampling. Third, compared to zero intelligence, the effect of learning on allocative effciency is sharply positive without resampling and mildly negative with resampling.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia in its series Working Papers with number 164.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in K. Schredelseker and F. Hauser (eds.), Complexity and Artificial Markets, Springer, 2008, 3-14
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2008-05-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2008-05-17 (Labour Economics)
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