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Price Formation in Double Auctions

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Author Info

  • Gjerstad, S.
  • Dickhaut, J.

Abstract

We develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction. Sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer. Similarly, buyers form beliefs that a bid will be accepted. These beliefs are formed on the basis of observed market data, including frequencies of asks, bids, accepted asks, and accepted bids. Then traders choose an action that maximizes their own expected surplus. The trading activity resulting from these beliefs and strategies is sufficient to achieve transaction prices at competitive equilibrium and complete market efficiency after several periods of trading.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Minnesota - Center for Economic Research in its series Papers with number 284.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:minner:284

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA 35455 U.S.A.
Phone: (612)625-6353
Fax: (612)624-0209
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Web page: http://www.econ.umn.edu/
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Keywords: PRICING; AUCTIONS;

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References

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  1. Hurwicz, Leonid & Radner, Roy & Reiter, Stanley, 1975. "A Stochastic Decentralized Resource Allocation Process: Part II," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 363-93, May.
  2. Vernon L. Smith, 1962. "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 111.
  3. Gjerstad, S. & Dickhaut, J., 1995. "Price Formation in Double Auctions," Papers 284, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
  4. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
  5. Daniel Friedman, 1982. "Price Formation in Double Auction Markets," UCLA Economics Working Papers 278, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Easley, David & Ledyard, John., . "Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions," Working Papers 611, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  7. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
  8. Gode, Dhananjay K & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 119-37, February.
  9. Ketcham, Jon & Smith, Vernon L & Williams, Arlington W, 1984. "A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 595-614, October.
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