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Which market protocols facilitate fair trading?

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Author Info
Marco LiCalzi () (Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice)
Paolo Pellizzari () (Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice)

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Abstract

We study the performance of four market protocols with regard to their ability to equitably distribute the gains from trade among two groups of participants in an exchange economy. We test the protocols by running (computerized) experiments. Assuming Walrasian tatonemment as benchmark, there is a clear-cut ranking from best to worst: batch auction, nondiscretionary dealership, the hybridization of a dealership and a continuous double auction, and finally the pure continuous double auction.

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File URL: http://www.dma.unive.it/wpdma/2007wp151.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice in its series Working Papers with number 151.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vnm:wpaper:151

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Related research
Keywords: allocative efficiency; allocative fairness; allocative neutrality; comparison of market institutions; market microstructure; performance criteria.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D69 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Other
G19 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Other

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  1. Marco LiCalzi & Paolo Pellizzari, 2008. "Zero-Intelligence Trading without Resampling," Working Papers 164, Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


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