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Registries

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Abstract

Governments and international development agencies often fail in their efforts to build and reform property and company registries. They implement misguided policies rooted in a poor understanding of the role that registries play in the modern economy. This work aims to remedy this situation by first presenting a theory of registries as market-enabling institutions which, by making private contracts verifiable by judges, enable truly impersonal (i.e., assetbased, in rem) trade without endangering property enforcement. The theory is then applied to discuss and guide major policy decisions that reformers face in the areas of land titling and business formalization, emphasizing the principle of registry independence, identifying courts as the key users of registries, clarifying the main choices of titling and formalization projects, and pointing out the presence of diseconomies of scope between contractual and administrative registries.

Suggested Citation

  • Benito Arruñada, 2014. "Registries," Economics Working Papers 1456, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1456
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property rights; land policy; land titling; registries; transaction costs; foreclosure crisis; business formalization; impersonal exchange.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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