Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The benefits of limited feedback in organizations

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

In most firms, managers periodically assess workers' performance. Evidence suggests that managers withhold information during these reviews, and some observers argue that this necessarily reduces surplus. This paper assesses the validity of this argument when workers have career concerns. Disclosure has two effects: it exposes the worker to uncertainty about future effort levels, but allows him to use current effort to influence his employer's beliefs about future effort. The surplus-maximizing disclosure policy reveals output realizations in the center of the distribution, but not in the tails. Thus, it is efficient for firms to reveal some but not all performance information.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/1232.pdf
File Function: Whole Paper
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 1232.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1232

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

Related research

Keywords: Performance Appraisal; Career Concerns; Incentives; Risk.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Career Concerns, Matching, And Optimal Disclosure Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1211-1250, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gibbs, Michael, 2012. "Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 6322, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Ghazala Azmat & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "The provision of relative performance feedback information: An experimental analysis of performance and happiness," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 1216, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1232. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.