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Is multi-party coalition government better for the protection of socially backward classes in India?

Author

Listed:
  • Kaushik Basu
  • Sattwick Dey Biswas
  • Pratik Harish
  • Sasi Dhar
  • Mounik Lahiri

Abstract

The paper investigates whether multi-party coalition government is better for the protection of socially backward classes, i.e. Scheduled Castes, in India. We have looked at the impact of types of government on the reduction of the gap between Scheduled Castes and Upper Castes in terms of various socio-economic indicators. Our analysis suggests that single-party majoritarian government is better at reducing the gap in terms of poverty and school drop-out rates, improves the employment scenario, and reduces the distressed migration.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaushik Basu & Sattwick Dey Biswas & Pratik Harish & Sasi Dhar & Mounik Lahiri, 2016. "Is multi-party coalition government better for the protection of socially backward classes in India?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-109, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2016-109
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Arvind Panagariya and Vishal More, 2013. "Poverty by Social, Religious and Economic Groups in India and its Largest States, 1993-94 to 2011-12," Working Papers 201302, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, revised Oct 2013.
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