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Stability in Matching with Couples having Non-Responsive Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Khare, Shashwat

    (Quantitative Economics, RS: GSBE ETBC)

  • Roy, Souvik

    (QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE ETBC)

Abstract

The paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. We specify that the couples have a "weak" preference to be matched together. We first assume that the institutions have common preference over all the individuals. We then characterize under which weak preferences of couples a stable matching exists. We then impose further conditions on the common preference of institutions over the individuals and prove existence of stable matching for unrestricted couple preferences. Finally, we establish a result on stability by relaxing the condition on common preference of institutions over individuals and assuming different preferences for different institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Khare, Shashwat & Roy, Souvik, 2017. "Stability in Matching with Couples having Non-Responsive Preferences," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017007
    DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2013. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(4), pages 1585-1632.
    4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi, 1997. "Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-475, August.
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    8. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 717, Boston College Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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