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Instabilité démocratique et économie : une relecture historique et méthodologique de la théorie électorale de Downs

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  • Julien Grandjean

Abstract

L’objet de cet article est de proposer une relecture de l’ouvrage d’Anthony Downs (1957), Une théorie économique de la démocratie, contribution fondatrice pour l’analyse économique du politique. En particulier, cette relecture a pour but de montrer de quelle façon le modèle déployé par Downs permet de révéler différentes contradictions du système électoral démocratique. Nous montrerons ainsi que l’ensemble de l’ouvrage est traversé par une thématique fondamentale qui est celle de l’instabilité de la démocratie. L’une des originalités sur laquelle nous insisterons est le fait que, chez Downs, c’est par le biais de l’incertitude et des mécanismes sociaux qui sont utilisés par les acteurs politiques pour y faire face – au premier rang desquels l’idéologie – que la démocratie se trouve stabilisée. Mais cette stabilité a un prix qui est celui de la rationalité dégradée.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Grandjean, 2019. "Instabilité démocratique et économie : une relecture historique et méthodologique de la théorie électorale de Downs," Working Papers of BETA 2019-47, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2019-47
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anthony Downs; instabilité; démocratie; élections; information; idéologie.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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